Reports from lectures given by Joan Crexells at the University of Salamanca in Josep Pla Pompeu Casanovas Being a nationalist is frequently regarded as an obstacle to adopting a cosmopolitan outlook, as being in direct opposition with it. Why is this so? Are there any particular circumstances in which both cosmopolitanism and nationalism can coexist and be compatible?
Or, on the contrary, are we faced with two irreconcilable ideologies? Following current debates on these issues, this paper offers a careful analysis of the specific conditions in which nationalism and cosmopolitanism might become compatible. The paper is divided into four sections.
First, it considers the treatment of nationalism in classical social theory and offers a detailed analysis of the concepts of state, nation and nationalism as well as the interrelations between the three. Second it introduces cosmopolitanism by studying its origins, development and key principles. Third, the paper adopts a comparative theoretical approach to establish a distinction between democratic and non- democratic forms of nationalism. Nationalism has traditionally been an uncomfortable topic for social scientists. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, we encounter numerous examples of major scholars who paid scant attention to what clearly was one of the major.
As I have shown elsewhere, Max Weber, a German nationalist himself never provided a systematic theory of nationalism. Weber revealed his German nationalism through his opposition to Polish immigration in eastern Germany, his support of German nationalists during the First World War, and his reaction against the Treaty of Versailles. He encouraged and correctly foresaw a movement of German irredentism after the First World War. But he recognized that this could only be possible if nations were free from their conquerors, because only then could the workers think in international terms about a working-class solidarity.
Instead, nationalism has played a key role in the modern age and it currently manifests itself as a potent force. Nationalism has often been associated with xenophobia, racism, discrimination and backwardness and regarded as a political doctrine opposed to the cosmopolitan ideal once formulated by Kant.
See E. Journal of Catalan Intellectual History. Issue 5. Nationalism is Janus-faced and it is important to establish a distinction between its two sides. Yet, in some cases nationalism is associated with xenophobia, racism and ethnic cleansing, while in other cases, it is applied to describe social movements led by peoples prepared to defend their right to exist and peacefully cultivate their own particular culture and language. Nationalism, however, cannot be viewed in isolation I argue that a clearcut distinction needs to be drawn between three main concepts: nation, state and nationalism.
This definition attributes five dimensions to the nation: psychological consciousness of forming a group , cultural, territorial, political and historical. However, there are numerous examples of more than one nation -and parts of nations- coexisting within a single state, nations whose boundaries stretch well beyond the borders of the state, and nations that leave some of its nationals outside while including some foreigners.
It is the exception rather than the rule to find an example of full coextensivity between nation and state. A state regarded as alien by the nation lacks legitimacy in nationalist terms. In turn and while accepting the principles of democracy and popular sovereignty, a nation has the right to decide upon its political destiny. This includes 5. Gerth and Wright Mills eds. However, not all nations are prepared or willing to create their own state, some are content with various degrees of political autonomy and federation within large political institutions.
It is usual to locate the rise of the nation-state and nationalism in late eighteenth-century Europe and to link their emergence to the ideas which gave rise to the American Revolution in and the French Revolution in When the revolutionaries stated that the principle of sovereignty resides essentially in the nation, they may be taken to have asserted that the nation was more than the king and the aristocracy. National selfdetermination turned out to be one of the most frequent interpretations of popular sovereignty. The spread of the new ideas of the philosophes emphasizing the cult of liberty, equality and, in particular, the idea of state power rooted in popular consent, where initially applied to the construction and consolidation of the nationstate as a modern political institution, characterized by the formation of a kind of state which has the monopoly of what it claims to be the legitimate use of force within a demarcated territory and seeks to unite the people subject to its rule by means of cultural homogenization.
It also highlights the fact that most states are formed by more than one nation; thus including various nations or parts of nations within their boundaries. Moreover, it also emphasizes the relevance of a wide range of strategies employed in the construction of new nations destined to confer legitimacy to the state; a process in which the non-eternal and dynamic nature of all nations is brought to the fore.
Yet while some nations are able to locate their ethnic roots in pre-modern times, others have emerged out of nation-building processes carried out from the late eighteenth century onwards. Nation, state and nationalism form a triad characterized by a constant tension between its three components. Hence, changes in the definition of one of the constituents have the capacity to influence and, to some extent, even alter the definitions of the other two.
For instance, if belonging to a nation is defined in terms of common blood, the definition of the state and with it that of citizenship, as an attribute conferred upon its members will have to include blood as a sine qua non condition for membership. Consequently, any nationalist movement emerging in these specific circumstances will focus upon common blood as a requisite for exclusion and inclusion in the nation that they want to defend and. In other cases, where common ancestry is replaced by territory or by the will to become a member act as the main condition for membership of a particular state, the definition of the nation and the character of nationalism are altered accordingly.
The example that I have just mentioned refers to conditions for membership, this is to elements which are considered indispensable in order to establish a distinction between those who belong and those who do not belong to the nation. However, alterations in the definitions of nation, state and nationalism are not restricted to conditions for belonging or criteria for membership. Once one of these self-definitions is adopted by a specific state, it has the capacity to influence the definition of the nation. This is particularly evident in the case of being confronted with a state that declares itself to be multinational, thus assuming the coexistence of more than one nation within its territory.
Such a position entails an automatic distinction between nation and state that challenges the commonly accepted coincidence between the two. A multinational state explicitly acknowledges its internal diversity and in so doing, it influences the range of definitions of nationalism that may emerge within its territory. First, in these cases, the nationalism instilled by the state will necessarily involve the acceptance of the nations included within its borders. This type of nationalism tends to focus on shared constitutional rights and principles as elements able to hold together an otherwise diverse citizenry.
In spite of this, often states seek the cultural and linguistic homogenization of their citizens. Whether at the same time states will be prepared or not to respect and recognize the particular cultures and languages of their national and ethnic minorities will depend on the political culture of each particular state. Alterations in the definition of nationalism have the power to impact upon the definitions of both the state and the nation.
A state endorsing this. So far I have offered some examples showing how differences in the nature and definition of one of the constituents of the triad trigger substantial variations in the definitions of the other two. A further consideration suggests that different definitions of nation, state and nationalism coexist simultaneously in different parts of the globe. Hence, the relation between the three components of the triad can be analyzed by focusing upon two different levels.
The first, as I have shown above, involves the study of how changes in the definition of one of the constituents affects the other two. The second moves on to consider the eventual emergence of external factors capable of altering the very nature of the triad by shifting the balance of power between its members and even threatening to undermine one of them at the expense of another.
Here we are confronted with radical transformations able to alter the more or less stable equilibrium existing between the triad by affecting their relationship at a structural level well above the particular situations considered when analyzing individual cases. At present, the main challenge to the relationship between the triad concerns the radical and rapid transformations altering the traditional nature of the state.
The proliferation of supranational institutions, the increasing number of multinational corporations, and the emergence of substate nationalist movements contrive a novel political scenario within which the traditional role of the state is being undermined in a fundamental way. Currently, democratic nationalist movements in nations without states such as Catalonia, Scotland and Quebec invoke the principle of consent and the idea of popular sovereignty to legitimate their claims for self-determination, a concept embracing a wide range of options encompassing political decentralization, devolution, federation and independence.
The recognition of the right to self-determination has the capacity to challenge the nation-state as a political institution, which, in most cases, has been created upon the attempt to seek the cultural and political homogenization of its citizens, paying scant attention to its own internal national diversity. Cosmopolitanism The Stoics initially formulated cosmopolitanism —they were a pre-Socratic philosophical school that criticized the historically arbitrary nature of boundaries of polities and their role in fostering a sense of difference between insiders and outsiders.
In their view, the emphasis placed on boundaries contributed to shifting the focus away from the human condition shared by all persons by stressing differences rather than commonality among them. Currently, cosmopolitanism has three central separate meanings which are often in tension. First, cultural cosmopolitanism is associated with those individuals who enjoy cultural diversity, are able to travel the world and tend to enjoy a privileged position, which places them well beyond ethnocentric views of culture and identity. This type of cosmopolitans forms a selected transnational elite and the study of their views on culture and identity belong to the realm of sociological analysis.
Second, philosophical cosmopolitanism relates to the adherence to a set of principles and values destined to attain global social justice and, with it, the elimination of dramatic disparities of wealth. This type of cosmopolitanism has a strong ethical nature. It is engaged in the quest for some minimal ethical values to be applicable to the whole of humanity; for instance, the commitment to Human Rights, as defined by the UN. Brock, and H. Jordanova and P.
Hulme eds. Third, institutional or political cosmopolitanism refers to the study of how novel forms of governance and political institutions might match up to a more cosmopolitan order. Yet, in some instances a tension arises between cultural and philosophical ethical cosmopolitanism. Hence, while the cultural cosmopolitan praises and enjoys diversity, the ethical cosmopolitan seeks to find some universal standard concerning what ought to be regarded as inalienable rights and principles to be applied to all members of humanity.
A certain inequality stands at the core of the privileges of which cultural cosmopolitans benefit. Therefore, resentment, lack of trust and criticism of cultural cosmopolitans usually originate among the ranks of less privileged people. According to ethical cosmopolitans, the quest for global social justice requires the mitigation of inequality, which, among other things, has allowed an elite to become cultural cosmopolitans.
For instance, a cosmopolitan ethicist could be very skeptical of the possibilities of a cosmopolitan culture, in turn; an institutional cosmopolitan may adhere to a variety of different ethical commitments. Not to mention differing views upheld by cosmopolitans with regard to the existing gap between cosmopolitan philosophy and social reality. The three key principles defended by scholars of philosophical cosmopolitanism, who are essentially ethical philosophers who focus on the nature.
Brock and H. Beitz, Thomas W. Brown, ed. Shapiro, and L. Brilmayer, eds. Held, and A. McGrew eds. I understand current accounts of cosmopolitanism to be closely related to the image of the world as a single interconnected place where an unparalleled degree of visibility brought about by the technological revolutions of the late 20th century and after have provided unprecedented awareness of political, cultural, linguistic, religious, gender, economic and other forms of difference. Within this novel scenario, increased multilevel interaction strengthens the case for cosmopolitanism as the ethics of the global age.
Cosmopolitan values defend the equality and freedom of all human beings, a principle already accepted and included in some constitutions, international norms and regulations. There is a big gap, however, between the theoretical vow to cosmopolitan principles and social reality since, at present, not a single institution or organization is recognized by all humans as capable of enforcing compliance with cosmopolitan principles and having sufficient power, legitimacy and means to punish those transgressing them.
The global world is not guided by cosmopolitan principles, although there are some signs that a growing transnational movement, if still incipient, is beginning to emerge. Yet, some cosmopolitan values are embedded in some international and regional institutions such as the UN, the International Criminal Court and the European Court of Justice, among others, as well as in some transnational social movements and organizations such as Amnesty International and Greenpeace, hence steppingstones exist.
Democratic nationalism and cosmopolitism A type of nationalism based on the believe in the superiority of a particular ethnic group —ethnocentrism— aiming to dominate and exploit other peoples economically, culturally, military or politically, is not compatible with cosmopolitanism. Non-democratic nationalism tends to embrace political ideologies infused with authoritarian, dictatorial or fascist ideas.
It fosters unequal relations and tends to promote illiberal and undemocratic forms of government. But not all nationalisms define their objectives and the means to achieve them in non-democratic terms. When studying the possible compatibility between nationalism and cosmopolitanism, the sometimes almost visceral rejection of anything related to nationalism on behalf of some defenders of cosmopolitanism, for whom nationalism is invariably associated with backwardness, ethnocentrism and even racism, has to be acknowledged.
Often, an instead of engaging in a dispassionate and rigorous analysis of the Janus-faced nature of nationalism, they tend to focus solely upon the pernicious side of nationalism. In so doing, they fail to. Two opposing ideas of nation and state came into play in the Spanish Civil War In contrast, the Republicans defended a moderately diffuse image of a state that would allow the historical nations, Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country, to enjoy a certain degree of political and cultural autonomy. However, it should be noted that the centralist view of the Spanish state was never exclusive to the Spanish extreme right, but rather a characteristic shared with most of the political spectrum.
The main difference between Spanish political forces lies in their attitude toward internal diversity: while democratic parties accept it, fascists reject it. Their nationalism was the result of a reaction against modern ideologies, such as socialism and anarchism, and also a rejection of the Catalan, Basque and Galician nationalist movements, regarded as a threat to the traditional socio-political structure of Spain.
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The II Spanish Republic had introduced progressive policies among them abortion, divorce, devolution and tried to build a state in which the historical nations were recognized and received 19 See M. Guibernau, Catalan Nationalism: francoism, transition and democracy, London: Routledge, X, nos. See also P. The right-wing nationalism of the Francoists reacted by calling a halt to the modernization of the country and choosing to maintain the traditional structures defended by broad sectors of conservative Catholics.
The opposition between the authoritarian nationalism of Francoism and the nationalism of the Catalans, Basques and Galicians, willing to lay claim to their difference was evident when studying the relationship between these two types of nationalism it is essential to understand that, while the regime had the power and the resources necessary to impose its vision of Spain, the peripheral nationalisms were dismembered or condemned to secrecy.
Indeed, after the Civil War, the majority of the most important representatives of the democratic political parties banned by the regime went into exile, were imprisoned or executed. The authoritarian state designed by Franco did not accept dissidence, and had conferred on itself, by force, the power to decide on the status of the historical nations included within its territory. Faced with a repression, which pervaded all daily activities of the population, most, although not all, Catalans responded with passive resistance.
They had been defeated, their country had been destroyed and they now lived in precarious conditions. They had to confront the presence of an army, which defended the dictatorship and an imported and imposed bureaucracy, which only spoke and wanted to hear Castilian. The official public sphere was completely dominated by the new regime.
Only certain sectors of the Catalan bourgeoisie received the Francoist victory with relief and showed their support for the new fascist ideology committed to protecting their economic interests. Catalan identity was preserved thanks to the dynamic and engaged action of a very small intellectual elite, but also thanks to family and friendship circles within which Catalan was spoken and traditional Catalan culture was maintained.
In spite of that they stood up in favor of the democratization of Spain and the right to self-determination of the Catalan people thus defending their right to preserve and develop their distinct culture, language and political institutions. Political parties were illegal and clandestine resistance to the dictatorship was actively persecuted and repressed. On 7 November about three hundred people representing different Catalan political, social and professional sectors founded the Assembly of Catalonia, a clandestine organization that soon became the broadest and most important unitary Catalan movement since the Civil War.
No similar unitary movement, in view of its scope and its relevance, was created in any other part of Spain. They all voiced the need to bring together democracy, left-wing policies and autonomy for Catalonia. Batista and J. Assembly members risked their own lives to defend democracy at a time when repression was commonplace. I argue that in defending freedom, democracy, dialogue and social justice the Catalan nationalism embodied in the Assembly of Catalonia stood up as an example of the compatibility between democratic nationalism and the main tenets of cosmopolitanism.
In particular because the objectives of Catalan nationalism went well beyond the specific democratization of Catalonia, rather they focused upon the democratization of Spain and the desire to join Western liberal democracies while committing their support for Human Rights. The Assembly worked tirelessly to circulate these demands and its mobilizing action continued until the first democratic parliamentary election held on 15 June From then on, the political parties became the new political actors. While compatibility between non-democratic forms of nationalism and cosmopolitanism is impossible, I argue that, coexistence between democratic forms of nationalism and cosmopolitanism stands as a viable alternative.
For instance both ideologies share xenophobia, intolerance and injustice as powerful common enemies. This is not to argue that democratic nationalism is either the only actual and possible condition for the emergence of cosmopolitanism or, that democratic nationalism will necessarily lead to a cosmopolitan outlook. Rather, it is my. Included as an appendix in A. In my view, whether nationalism is compatible with cosmopolitanism or not depends on the political ideology nationalism is associated with.
This is, a democratic form of nationalism —associated with social-democracy, socialism or liberalism, to mention but a few political ideologies that usually inform democratic nationalist political action- subscribing to the principles of social justice, deliberative democracy and individual freedom shares some of its values with cosmopolitanism.
In contrast, non-democratic forms of nationalism associated with fascist and authoritarian ideologies stand in outright opposition with cosmopolitanism and democratic nationalism alike. Being a cosmopolitan involves a commitment to global equality, but is it possible to sustain such a commitment and defend a preferential treatment for fellow-nationals? This is the crux of the matter when analyzing whether cosmopolitanism and nationalism can be compatible. The response is a nuanced one. I understand that the basic tenets of global equality are the avoidance of death by poverty and the fulfillment of Human Rights as defined by the UN.
A clash between cosmopolitanism and nationalism comes to light whenever the nation, through its policies, contributes to global poverty and the transgression of human rights. Although one should be aware of the non-homogeneous nature of the majority of nations and also bear in mind that, national belonging is not attributed the same value and status by all citizens.
Nations are not eternal but subject to change and they are hardly ever culturally homogeneous. In spite of that, it is possible to speak about a sense of community emerging out of a shared sentiment of belonging to the same nation while simultaneously acknowledging that there will be always a number of people who will remain outside and feel alienated due to social, cultural, economic, religious or other factors. Yet, the compatibility between nationalism and cosmopolitanism still hinges on whether the cosmopolitan commitment to global equality can be reconciled with the nationalist principle of granting priority to fellow nationals.
At this point, we could push this a bit further and ask whether the commitment to global equality is compatible with giving priority to family members and friends. In a similar manner, a democratic nationalism prompting people to be aware and sensitive to cosmopolitan values may contribute to strengthen the influence of cosmopolitanism. See, D. Mapel, and T. Nardin eds. Their concern for the nation and fellow nationals should be accompanied by a clear commitment to the cosmopolitanism values of social justice, freedom and dialogic democracy. For instance, I regard support for the International Criminal Court as a step towards global justice.
By supporting this initiative, democratic nationalisms will be contributing to the strengthening of cosmopolitan values at a global level. Attachment to fellow nationals does not imply denigration and disrespect for others. It is my concern that the sentiments of solidarity that individuals tend to develop towards members of their own community have the capacity to generate a sense of special duty and care towards them. Being prepared to support your fellow nationals as well as the expectation that one would be assisted by them when in need constitutes a major tenet of social cohesion, this is, a situation in which a minimum set of values and principles able to maintain a sense of unity and common purpose are shared among the members of a particular society who are also prepared to make sacrifices for the well-being of the community.
But, why national solidarity is so important? Basically, because we do not live in a cosmopolitan world within which individuals feel free, equal, secure and are treated with dignity wherever they go regardless or their origin, gender, age, class and culture. Although some stepping-stones are pointing in the direction of cosmopolitanism, most nations remain engaged in a constant competition with each other, their relations being determined by their own power and status within the international community. Liberal nationalism focuses on the connection between liberal democracy and the nation-state.
These principles are: — Social Justice. It is the concern of many liberals that moral cosmopolitanism —that is the commitment to global social justice— is better accomplished by fostering it within the nation-state rather than by the creation of some kind of —still so far inexistent— global state. The construction of a welfare state can be regarded as a step toward social justice within a particular society and, as its name indicates, the state is its creator and designer. However the intrinsic association of the nation-state with power and the use of violence generates a tremendous tension between its commitment to liberal democratic values and its determination to place national aims before cosmopolitan commitments.
Although some relevant attempts have been made recently aiming at the adoption of principles destined to promote global social justice, the scope of their impact is limited when compared with those principles according supremacy to the nation-state. For instance, it is true that, in some cases, nation-states seeking their own benefit or trying to protect themselves have sabotaged global initiatives destined to tackle specific transnational issues related to social justice such as global warming, genocide, the status and treatment of immigrants and refugees as well as national minorities, to mention but a few.
In a corresponding manner, a possible path towards global democracy may be achieved through the promotion of democratic citizenship at national level. Citizens should be encouraged to transcend their own national interests by balancing them with a genuine commitment to cosmopolitan values. Democracy, tolerance and respect within a given society can never be fully attained through the strict compliance with the law - although the law and in particular the threat of punishment tend to persuade those inclined to act otherwise to comply with it. These are attitudes and values that need to be learned, internalized and regarded as so precious that individuals should be prepared to make sacrifices to preserve them.
In my view, a genuinely democratic political culture is difficult to achieve, it cannot be improvised and heavily relies on democratic values being introduced through education, political practice, the media and public debate. A commitment to democracy presupposes readiness to engage in a dynamic process, which recognizes dialogue as a means to reach solutions and overcome differences.
Democracy, if only applied to the political arena, does not guarantee the construction of a democratic society. I regard democracy as a vital attitude defining private and public relations and occurring in the political, social and economic milieu. The relationship between individual autonomy and national culture is a complex one.
This is why national culture makes individual freedom meaningful. National identity offers a moral anchor to individuals by means of the specific corpus of knowledge and values it embodies. This represents the context within which individuals make choices and foster solidarity bonds with fellownationals. Trust and mutual respect are likely to emerge among people socialized within a shared democratic culture including a value system. One of the major weaknesses of liberal nationalism is its emphasis on individual rights and its disregard for collective rights, a concept of uppermost significance for democratic nationalists.
I argue that individual rights cannot be fully enjoyed if they are not conceived within a framework including respect for collective rights. Thus, for an individual to be able to develop all its potentialities, he or she cannot be considered in isolation but as a member of one or more groups.
Two sets of different rights which complement each other need to be taken into account, those concerning the individual as a free agent, and those related to the social dimension of individuals who live within specific communities. In late modernity, these communities tend to be nations. After years of developing and promoting individual rights, we are now confronted with the socio-political need to counteract an exceedingly individualistic society threatened by a fragmentation resulting from a growing lack of civic coherence.
Conclusion We live in a world of nations within which national identity compels individuals to social and political action and where national loyalty takes precedence over cosmopolitan allegiances. We do not live within a cosmopolitan order, although some progress has been made in this direction. At present, the cosmopolitan ideal remains far removed from the constant competition, conflict and war defining international relations. It is within this context that most individuals turn towards their own nations as a source of identity but also as an environment within which they enjoy some rights.
As I have showed in this paper, there are certain instances in which nationalism and cosmopolitanism may be compatible. The objectives of Catalan nationalism went well beyond the specific democratization of Catalonia, rather they focused upon the democratization of Spain and the desire to join Western liberal democracies while committing their support for Human Rights. Democratic nationalism is legitimate. It defends the right of nations to exist and develop while recognizing and respecting internal diversity.
Only by being committed to these principles can democratic nationalism become compatible with cosmopolitanism. From a normative perspective, I argue that all nations —with and without states— should be encouraged to set up the conditions favoring the emergence of cosmopolitanism as an attitude compelling individuals to add a further dimension to their care and concern for fellow nationals by raising awareness about the respect, dignity, freedom and equality that should be granted to all human beings.
Indeed, while this process applies to those reaching out to cosmopolitanism via democratic nationalism, I am aware that others are adopting a cosmopolitan perspective from the outset while remaining skeptical of all forms of nationalism, democratic or not. Yet by comparing the main tenets of both democratic nationalism and cosmopolitanism and establishing the conditions for their compatibility, I have sought to bridge the theoretical opposition between the two.
I am convinced that the political agenda for the future of nations should include the commitment to cosmopolitan ideals and values capable of informing political action and adding a new moral dimension to national identity and nationalism. The advent of cosmopolitanism requires the pledge to eradicate social, political and economic exploitation of individuals and nations. Its strength as a political and moral ideology will depend on its own ability to act as a transformative force leading a multidimensional process destined to change the relations of power in society.
I envisage it to encounter fierce opposition. Original in English by the author. It invigorated him to spend those two or three days amongst friends and in an atmosphere of such freedom. We have to publish a magazine that is both pro-and anti-regime at one and the same time. But his words endured and have gathered the strength of an axiom. To consolidate its advance, however, the regime also needed to fill the vacuum left by those thinkers who had been sent into exile.
But these were soon overshadowed by a far more original and ambitious publishing venture: Destino. This activity brought together many different pro-regime forces, from the civil and military administrators and their attendant personnel to the returning fugitives of and the newly-enlisted or veteran rank and file of the falange, and the carlists and catholics of the unified falange forces.
The structure of culture and knowledge that was to replace the republican and Catalan nationalist mindset were assembled with the help of both new and older mechanisms, by appropriating political platforms and cells that had existed before and combining these with the conviction that journalists —or rather, the analysts and chroniclers of the daily and weekly newspapers— could become the means to transmit the new power.
This means, therefore, that the journalist must serve and that in serving he must prove his most humble submission to the mandates decreed by this new order So it was that in Barcelona the local falange cell commanded by Luis G. Santamarina took control of. But before very long, more ambitious groups of thinkers began to appear, spearheaded by the magazine Destino. However, the illusion of plurality created by so many forums could not really hide the intentions of the dictatorship, whose stone tablet would never accept an alternative political discourse.
The same premise also held for the Barcelona of the pro-regime essayists, journalists and analysts who explained to their readers exactly what the European arena of the Second World War should mean to them as well as instructing them in any number of other, equally important issues. And the political landscape of platforms and individuals was therefore characterized by many different shades of grey, even though the majority views were essentially the same.
And although there were sometimes problematic differences in origins, the various circles of writers and thinkers were not impervious to one another. None of these three would have been ready to bow and scrape to Galinsoga and he was probably not particularly enamoured of them either; but neither would he have considered them a dissident force or threat to his own position.
Cultivating a falange moustache, he began that series of articles which were to be gathered in the book Unsiglo. Certainly, the content of the text cited in Footnote 2 is very much in tune with the times in which it was written —March , in this particular case— and confirms what few are actually aware of: that in the mid-forties, during this final stage of the Second World War, the falangist writers of the weekly broadsheet Estilo had suffered a decisive defeat and had been abandoned by the Catalan reading public in favour of more challenging, complex styles of journalism that were more relevant to their lives.
The carlistfalangist Feliciano Baratech was one of these, a champion of the fascist unification movement of April , a mainstay in the publication Solidaridad Nacional and an influential contributor to the magazine Azor which, in , had been reinstated after its demise in the Republican years. Other no less notable figures. But he took it into his head to initiate some kind of transformation, harking after Portela, and made it his business to argue that the results of the War might be detrimental to the Falange First, they recruited a number of eminent men of letters who could give the paper respectability and authority: Josep M.
Other important figures were the new representatives of the regime who were arriving in Barcelona. Internationally, that reality was divided in three main blocks: the decadent democracies, the GermanItalian axis and the barbaric Asian countries. No further distinctions were deemed necessary. The list goes on, including such writers as.
In short, although some local writers were more or less regularly included in the newspaper FerranVallsTaberner, Josep M.
Junoy and Josep M. Tallada, for example there were not enough to balance the scales. The more general public announcements and obituaries of Solidaridad Nacional continued to be read but its political and intellectual content could not be made to suit a reading public who wanted something else. In , Galinsoga was considered a source of irritation rather than a man whose opinion counted.
But although the writers of Destino were prepared to face and somehow get round these obstacles, they appreciated that some serious reflection was needed to understand who and what had put them there in the first place. In the summer of he had fled from Barcelona and after travelling through Italy had settled in nationalist-occupied Spain, where he wrote for different papers including Destino. Nadal explained that those. Their foothold in our region now firm, our comrades on the second Front have started to act less like refugees [ In other words, they became specialists of a sort, thinkers who could generate very specific wartime opinions that their readers would then hold, who would always follow the party line but whose take on current affairs would be considerably more stimulating.
On the one hand, we should note that many of the issues they addressed were subject to the course of events and might disappear as quickly as they had appeared: in the years and , for example, the magazine still regularly lauded the Nazi model of conquest and the genius of Hitler, the future hopes of fascist Italy and the promise of a new European order controlled by the three great anti-communist powers; but as the weakening military power of Germany.
If this is all true, then what was the basis for certain claims that Destino was pro-ally? In what circumstances did this notion gather legitimacy? One factor might be the passage of time itself, meaning the many opportunities across the years for history to be rewritten and for its actors to be recast. Perhaps because Luis de Galinsoga was there to blame, Destino became very much appreciated after But did its writers really sympathize with the Allies or not?
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The most significant point in his argument in , however, was that democratic systems were what most clearly lead to war. At that time, the Second World War was about to enter its third year and had already stretched beyond. In other words, the War was so far advanced that an objective analysis of how it had originally come about was already going to be a somewhat tall order. The Allies shared a series of objectives that these journalists would never have wished to be part of, from the defeat of fascism in its Italian and German varieties to the reconstruction of democratic systems of government and the recovery of freedom in the states that had been occupied by Germany; from their hopes that a new Europe could be guaranteed peace in a just and equitable manner to their determination to rebuild Europe according to the tenets of democracy, federalism and intercontinental cooperation; or from the defence of human rights and the rejection of solutions that could only be imposed by brute force to the reconstruction of an arena for international cooperation that would be like the League of Nations but stronger still.
Another factor would also have held these journalists back: to be proally meant having a particular political profile which would be very difficult to maintain in either Barcelona or Madrid. To start with, one would need to be anti-. Of course, nobody felt obliged to hide their anti-communist feelings— Winston Churchill and Charles de Gaulle certainly never did—but all those states which had been threatened by the Axis powers were anti-Nazi and anti-fascist. Moreover, one might defend the notions of the republic or the monarchy, but always in democratic terms and with constitutional systems that could be homologated to those systems that had already existed in most of Western Europe.
Did this position necessary exclude the communists? From a liberal-conservative point of view or for a christian democrat or social democrat, surely this was so. Like a game of nine-pins, when France had fallen there would be nothing left between Germany and Britain and the Soviet Union; the Third Reich would systematically bowl over one country and then the other. Driven by their visceral anti-communism and their contempt for democratic forms of government, the Barcelona journalists were incapable of understanding this idea. The long and the short of it is that there is nothing new about this conciliatory sector of the English public that would take the Central powers for an ally.
The increasing intensity of the German bombing will remain an important conditioner in such matters, we can be sure. But in contrast to the dictatorships of that period, itknew exactly what it was facing. Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be freed and the life of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands. But if we fail, then the whole world, including the United States, including all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new dark age made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of perverted science.
But would it? His doubts, of course, were justified. It is devoid of all theme and principle except appetite and racial domination. It excels all forms of human wickedness in the efficiency of its cruelty and ferocious aggression. Noone has been a more consistent opponent of Communism than I have for the last twenty-five years. I will unsay no word that I have spoken about it. But all this fades away before the spectacle which is now unfolding.
The past with its crimes, its follies and its tragedies flashes away. I see the Russian soldiers standing on the threshold of their native land, guarding the fields which their fathers have tilled from time immemorial. From this nothing will turn us — nothing. We will never parley, we will never.
These, quite simply, are the politics that triumphed in Munich but that Chamberlain had unfortunately abandoned in return for the policies offered by the opposition, on the basis, most importantly, of the destruction of Czechoslovakia in March And it is basically in the interests of the English that this happens before they have gained knowledge of the beginnings of the German invasion.
We all know how much the world could gain if the war were to end now. It would be the perfect opportunity to begin the reconstruction of Europe according to the new designs that have been established and to avoid the dangers of further areas of conflict. If London refuses to answer that call then it will have no one to blame but itself for the catastrophe that will befall it. Any man or state who fights on against Nazidom will have our aid. His invasion of Russia is no more than a prelude to an attempted invasion of the British Isles. Further examples abound.
Grappling on the brink
The analyst Andres Revesz who also occasionally wrote for Solidaridad Nacional and for ABC and Blanco y Negro in Madrid and who would later be considered an ally sympathizer declared that Churchill had written off his nation to a country doomed to military failure. And what will the Anglo-Saxons have to say about the defeat of their allies? Perhaps they will regret having forged such close ties with a regime that was destined to disappear. I do not only speak in moral terms, however. The men involved might protest that the government watchedtheir production far too closely for to them to write in any other way than they did and with any greater complexity than they did.
This, indeed, is what some complained of and to a certain extent it was the truth. In return for allowing them to join him, Stalin has demanded and obtained from all the democracies carte blanche for all manner of bolshevik propaganda. And thus, the powers in London and Washington have subjugated themselves to the service of European bolshevism and the annihilation of Western culture. At the beginning of , when the end of the War was some way off but Italy had fallen and the Red Army was advancing on the Eastern Front, some particularly interesting explanations were being offered in Madrid as to what exactly ally sympathy or pro-British sentiment meant.
It was as simple as that. But one important thing had been achieved: in Spain, the anglophile trend actually gathered force in different social spheres. The short answer is, no. Indeed, the many moments when these two groups agreed and even the manner in which they agreed disproves the thesis —always proposed long after the facts themselves— that perhaps those. We see that it was on this very day that Spain readied itself, four years ahead of time, to take its place in the new order that would rule over the continent.
And it did so instinctively, because it believed in the national necessity, of its own account and by no other force, neither by persuasion from those who were abroad nor by the events that had taken place there. Not only were the coincidences between the two camps and their identification with one other quite notable; there were also signs that both the party liners and the journalists had assessed the realities of the War according to the same specific criteria. What set of values was Nadal working from when he set the blame for the war on the shoulders of the Soviets who had occupied Vienna rather than on the men who had created the terrifying reality of the Nazi extermination camps?
What principles did he use to analyze the War and its aftermath? What exactly lay behind the strange choice he made between two kinds of photographs? Was it representative of what he normally wrote and wrote without undue pressure for mass consumption by his countrymen? Aware of the temporal nature of its mandate, Germany is making haste to implement its system and demonstrate the benefits of its particular Arcadia to all the countries around it. Revesz reiterates the importance of one course of action which the regime might have considered to make the best of its new, uncomfortable reality but which it never really did: the notion that in one sudden move it might replace its economic, intellectual and ideological commitment to Nazi Germany with its resistance to the new Soviet expansionist policies and that it might run up an anti-communist, anti-Soviet flag that could be shared with the Allies.
In the event, it managed to do neither. On the contrary, the regime busied itself with making sure that no internal instability would now become a challenge. In practical terms there existed —there had always existed— wars that simultaneously served different political purposes and embraced many conflicting interests. Because of this, within the strictures of the tactical agreements imposed by military necessity, the various warring sides always revealed different attitudes and chose different roads in the aftermath of conflict.
An objective examination of war would always lead us to the same conclusion: a country would have an initial position with regard to war and a final position with regard to the peace that came afterwards. And the Caudillo further observed the radical difference between our expectations about the War in the East, where the subject of dispute was a communist border, and the conflict in the Western European arena, whose protagonists were christian nations and with whom we have maintained friendly relations marked by cultural and economic exchange.
The fact is that even if their political or ideological persuasions differed, thinkers in many camps actually agreed on the most important things, which of course meant the dictates of the Caudillo. Was this proof of the power that can be exercised over a media structure, however big it is or however prestigious its exponents are? Or was it the logical result of political and ideological coincidences between people who shared a project, if not their origins, and a certain way of understanding the world?
The notion that the threat of censorship might dissuade them from writing and publishing an alternative discourse does not sit well with the facts and it is difficult to imagine these men, in the years or , sitting down to write articles denouncing their regime and its dictator. But there is another way of understanding their circumstances. Their intellectual class, the substance of their professional careers andtheir acute cultural sensibilities would never have allowed them to become mere scribes for the powersabove them. What men! Almost mythical in stature, veritable superhuman beings that loom over the likes of Churchill, Roosevelt or Eisenhower.
But neither man dreamt of the day when Spain would implement a system of democracy in its landsand form a legal stateon a par with those nation-states that populated Western Europe from onwards. Ganas de hablar. Barcelona: Planeta. Destino [Barcelona], , 28 June. Destino [Barcelona], , 4 November. La Vanguardia [Barcelona], 9 July.
La Vaguardia [Barcelona], 6 October. Solidaridad Nacional [Barcelona], 20 June. Solidaridad Nacional [Barcelona], 13 and 14 July. Azor [Barcelona], 2 30 November. Solidaridad Nacional [Barcelona], 31 July. Destino [Barcelona], 21 April. Destino [Barcelona], 12 May. Destino [Barcelona], 16 June. Destino [Barcelona], 2 March.
Destino [Barcelona], 9 March. Thesis, unpublished. Bellaterra: UAB. Solidaridad Nacional [Barcelona], 30 June. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Periodistes uniformats. Diaris barcelonins dels anys Josepa Les tres vides de Destino.
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El valor de la disidencia. Cultura y vida cotidiana. Barcelona: Eds. Lliga catalana. Segle XX. Vic: Eumo. La Vanguardia [Barcelona], 24 July. Destino [Barcelona], 82 25 September. Destino [Barcelona], 28 October. Destino [Barcelona], 30 March. Destino [Barcelona], , 2 August.
Destino [Barcelona], , 15 November. Destino [Barcelona], , 25 March. Solidaridad Nacional [Barcelona], 20 April. Barcelona: Columna. ABC [Madrid], 1 January. Madrid: Ediciones Europa, La guerra secreta de Franco — Destino [Barcelona], 2 July. Diversidad de origen e identidad de intereses. Barcelona: La Campana. Ecos de papel. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva. Unknown author a. Destino[Burgos], 18 3 July. Unknown author b. Destino [Burgos], 18 3 July. Unknown author c. Destino [Burgos], 8 24 April. Unknown author d. Destino [Burgos], 10 8 May.
Unknown author Unknownauthor b. ABC [Madrid], 24 June. Estilo [Barcelona], 11 14 March. El franquismo en guerra. It all began with a Falangist who, without receiving any orders, decided to assail the University; immediately the old professors were cast out. What followed was a period in which, in the Philosophy Department, ideology was more important than teaching preparation, and the ambition for power and prestige was the driving force in the professional careers of the new professors.
He was part of a group of Fifth Columnists1 who, on the morning of March 29th, , occupied the University, just a day before the Francoist troops burst into Valencia. He led all the maneuvers quickly, efficiently and organized in a sequence worth reproducing here. The first step was to show up at the University on the morning of the 29 with the rest of the Fifth Columnists, some of them professors who had been eliminated during the Republican era. He decided that someone would th. As a result of this decision, he now had the task of selecting the new professors, at least for the time being.
He chose the professors who had been persecuted and expelled from the Republican educational system. By four in the afternoon he had already chosen all the deans and professors, not only for the institutions of higher learning, but also for the institutes and secondary schools. So, at that same time, he drew up the joint document declaring his assumption of the rectorship and the naming of the new professors.
This entire occupation had been decided and carried out without the approval of the Francoist authorities. Batlle then returned to Murcia, where he was named dean of the Law Department. Yet his rise in the ranks continued, and in he was given the rectorship of the University of Murcia, which he used to keep that university mired in the mediocrity that, according to him, the provinces deserved. A mediocrity that guaranteed tranquility and eliminated all possibility of altercations and revolts within his domain.
Some months later, he died. This Valencian professor knew how to be in the right place at the right time. Finally, he chose to study Exact Sciences. We know that this experience was a decisive one in his academic life. Impressed, AlcaydeVilar felt he had discovered his true vocation and decided to quit mathematics and start studying philosophy.
Once he finished his degree course, he earned a doctorate with Ortega y Gasset, with a thesis entitled Passions as the link between body and soul and, immediately afterwards, he began to prepare for his competitive exams. After four and a half years he finally obtained a university professorship.
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His first post was in Santiago de Compostela, where he was professor of Fundamental Logic. He remained in that city for three years, during which he wrote a play and married Carmen Miranda, the daughter of the former Captain General of Cartagena, who he had begun to court during his stay in Madrid. The next city in his particular, hectic itinerary was Salamanca, where the rector was Miguel de Unamuno, who Alcayde was bursting with pride at having met. He described him as a man of imposing character and physique who was always surrounded by students from other universities and travellers who sought him out to ask for his autograph.
After Salamanca he went to Granada, right before arriving at his final destination: Valencia. It was in , at 42 years old, that he was able to return to his hometown. The Valencian university had always been his goal. So we have only followed the teachings of the master when he tells us that the professor should not seek out personal glory and renown in his chair, but the glory and renown of the person who formulated the doctrines he explains.
The current typical characteristics, both of pro-Catalan Valencian trends and Catalonophobe trends, have nothing to do with the regionalism that was timidly spreading in s Valencia. Independence was nowhere near the fate that AlcaydeVilar, nor any other Valencianist at that time, would have imagined for their homeland. They merely strove to reform the Spanish State so it would abandon its centralist stance and give more recognition to the Valencian culture, but while continuing to give merit and tribute to Spain from the fruits of that Valencia culture.
The problem with Valencianism was understood as a culturalism. Its goal, among others, was to support and propagate Valencian culture. He also was well received in the pro-Valencian cultural institutions: he was a member of the Valencian Cultural Center and the Rat Penat. In philosophical questions he presented himself as a Catholic thinker, though not a scholastic. We should explain that scholasticism was traditionally the prevailing philosophical current in Spanish universities.
Remember that he wrote his thesis with Ortega, which led him to study, at least superficially, the works of Kant and Husserl. Of course,. Within speculative psychology, he focused on the issues of the psychology of peoples and of emotions, and passions. He wrote a few books on emotions and passions, most noteworthy among them Las emociones[Emotions]. From the examination of these theories, he comes to the conclusion that there are two opposing general theories, but that all of them have some common factors. Then the book includes a section detailing experiments carried out on children and adults about the emotions they feel in certain circumstances and what physical reactions come into play in those moments.
Lastly, the author makes a classification and detailed description of each of the emotions that he believes we can feel throughout our lives, and adds as a colophon a 17th -century Italian text entitled Trattado di Fisionomia, which relates anatomy with psychology and aspires to explain which physical characteristics reveal concrete personality traits. As you can see, it is rudimentary, arbitrary and more appropriate for the spiritual nourishment of a gypsy than as scientific element.
The distinction must 3. The expression of an emotion is the emotion itself externalized, while physiognomy of an individual can, sometimes, completely and unconsciously falsify his character. Barcelona, Edicions 62, S. More information about this seller Contact this seller 9. Barcelona, I.
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