We also have an Army Reserve component in Rhode Island, which does our overhead work [overhead lines, bucket trucks] wherever the th is deployed. If disaster, we have a worldwide contract office that can get equipment wherever it is needed. Military Academy at West Point, August Under the current structure, Alpha Company Headquarters and four prime power platoons are based in Hawaii, providing support to USACE requirements in the Pacific, although that may be supplemented as needed by other companies.
Bravo Company and four prime power platoons are based out of Fort Bragg, N. Delta Company, the Reserve component of the th, is headquartered out of Cranston, R. The prime power military occupational specialty is so technical and so rare that the th must operate its own school. Army Prime Power School, managed by th personnel, trains all prime power Soldiers who enter the battalion. They normally teach three classes, 30 students each, per year; in reality, the school typically produces about 70 to 75 Army graduates a year, all going to the th. We also have students from the Navy — all prime power production specialists — and a few from the Air Force.
There have been no foreign students to date, but that may change soon. Delta Company, the all-Reserve unit, has its headquarters and three platoons in Cranston, and a fourth platoon at Fort Belvoir. The th has a small command contingent of officers, with the bulk of its members being noncommissioned officers, primarily because the Prime Power School is restricted to E-4s and E-5s.
The Soldiers were working through FEMA and with city and state officials to conduct assessments to determine if and how electrical power could safely be installed. The United States' protest was answered by Japan's request for the removal of our nationals. A few days later Japanese aircraft repeated the bombing. Thereafter, Japan requested all nations to remove from China all troops and war equipment which they might have in that area. During these times the Japanese occupation forces in various parts of China harassed and assaulted American citizens, destroyed their property, and even attacked missions and missionary hospitals.
This was part of a terrorist campaign to compel foreigners to evacuate. This request was backed by an ultimatum and threats of force, but even while awaiting a favorable reply the Japanese occupied strategic points. The Japanese had occupied the island of Hainan in , which is abreast of Indo-China.
On 27 September Japan signed a treaty of alliance with Germany and Italy which provided for mutual assistance in the establishment of Japanese leadership of a "New Order" in Asia, and for German-Italian leadership of a "New Order" in Europe. This was highly important to Japan's objectives, and it was a clever move on the part of Germany and Italy. It was intended to require the United States to defend itself in the Pacific and thus to reduce her strength in the Atlantic.
In case the United States should enter the European conflict its military forces, especially its Navy, would be divided between the Atlantic and the Pacific. At about this time the United States announced discontinuance of steel and scrap exportation to Japan. This was in accordance with the Export Control Act of July Japan immediately protested this action as an "unfriendly act," whereupon Secretary of State Hull stated that it was "amazing" that, after violating American rights and interests, to question this sort of response, especially when in the subjugation of China the United States is called unfriendly unless we sit on the sideline cheerfully and agreeably as these acts go on.
Many discussions were held between the diplomats of the United States and Japan to improve a deteriorating situation. The United States pointed out Japan's program of expansion by military force, together with. The above is a paraphrase of Secretary Hull's reply to Ambassador Horiguchi. Secretary of State Hull cautioned that Japan's "best interests lay in the development of friendly relations with the United States and with other countries which believed in orderly and peaceful international processes.
Grew, reported rumors that Japanese military forces planned a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in case of trouble with the United States. Beginning in March continuous conferences were held in Washington between Japanese Ambassador Nomura and the State Department for the settlement of differences with regard to the Japanese policy which was sloganized as a "New Order in Greater East Asia.
In May Japan proposed a settlement based on recognition by the United States of Manchukuo, recognition of peaceful expansion of Japan to the south, and discontinuance of United States material assistance to China. In return Japan would guarantee the neutrality of the Philippine Islands. The Japanese were not willing to commit themselves unreservedly to a policy of peace, and would not abandon their ties with Hitler and Mussolini.
These became effective in July whereupon the President of the United States proposed neutralization of Indo-China so that all nations could carry on trade and commerce. Japan rejected this proposal. Then on 1 August, the United States imposed an oil embargo on Japan. For several years military control of the Japanese government had been in the ascendancy.
Almost full army control had been gained by threat, pressure, and assassination. The conservative elements, even including the Emperor, were shunted aside. In return for discontinuance of the United States' trade restrictions, Japan offered to cooperate in a development of natural resources and trade in the southwest Pacific. At the same time the survival of Great Britain was in serious doubt.
Japanese diplomats now proposed a conference between their Premier Konoye and President Roosevelt to reach an overall settlement. But they were unwilling to agree in advance on the basic principles which the United States had consistently championed and which Japan had consistently violated. But, as always, the Japanese stated that they "had no intention of using 'without provocation,' military force against any neighboring nation.
On 3 November Ambassador Grew explained to the United States government that the militaristic government of Japan could not be stopped, and that war could not be averted by the imposition of economic embargoes or sanctions. On 17 November he suggested that vigilance against sudden Japanese naval or military attack was essential.
In November Japan's special envoy, Mr. Kurusu, arrived in Washington and endeavored with the help of the Japanese Ambassador to justify Japan's situation, which was really fully understood by our State Department. He had nothing new to offer on the crucial question of Japan's aggressions. The United States promised that if Japan would indicate some peaceful intentions they would be well responded to. Since Japan's expressions of peaceful intent contained qualifications and restrictions, and did not budge from the fundamental objectives stated by its military leaders, the United States under date of 26 November made crystal clear its position.
The American note was sent when it was fully realized that the long drawn-out negotiations to improve the relations between the two governments were failing. In early December there were threatening Japanese troop movements into Southeast Asia. When this was protested by President Roosevelt. On 6 December President Roosevelt transmitted a telegram to the Emperor of Japan appealing for cooperation toward eliminating any form of military threat, and for restoring traditional unity. Under date of 7 December Japan's reply to the 26 November message was delivered to Secretary Hull.
The message was abusive and condemnatory, and ended with breaking off the negotiations. Secretary Hull said to the Japanese diplomats: "I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions -- infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them. The world now knows that when the Japanese note was written their naval task force was on the way to attack Pearl Harbor, and the attack had.
Secretary Hull's statement of 7 December to the Japanese diplomats. This certainly shows bad faith on the part of the Japanese. Their attack force was assembled and underway before the 26 November note was received by them; their basis for peace was premised upon an unbending attitude regarding Japanese policies in the Pacific; their continued diplomatic efforts were fraudulent because they knew that the United States would not agree to their demands. The gathering clouds of war in Europe and the Far East became more and more ominous to the United States during each of the half dozen years preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Because of our nation's firm commitment to peace there was much sympathy and concern among Americans for the victims of the aggression. In the early stages of unprincipled aggression abroad there seemed little need to worry about what was developing in other countries, or what our own welfare and eventual security might be.
Yet as time went on and situations became more critical we found ourselves the only major world power that was not engaged in warfare. Even when our foreign trade and property were jeopardized and our citizens abroad were endangered we were reluctant to take decisive actions which might possibly embroil us in the worldwide conflict. Even while condemning the aggressor nations the large majority of our people demanded peace and neutrality for themselves.
As pressures mounted our diplomatic policy stood firmly for cooperative observance of law and order by all nations. Yet in most cases we found ourselves impotent in negotiating settlements for the benefit of world peace or our own interests. The unremitting efforts made by our country, as well as the efforts made by the victimized nations, proved that talk, discussion, and negotiation were almost futile.
Aggressor nations are no more susceptible to logical argument than outlaws bent on plunder. Both operate by force of arms, and it requires force of arms to restrain them.
The major dilemma confronting the United States was whether to tolerate a wholly unsatisfactory world situation, or to resort to forceful intervention. Neither was acceptable nor really possible, but nevertheless the great prob-. How to strengthen our diplomatic voice in the world without building a sufficient military force to back up adequately that voice was a real dilemma faced by our government. A specific dilemma in the case of Japan's policy in China, the Secretary of State noted, was to come to amicable agreement with Japan but not at the expense of China.
A related dilemma was how to make preparations against the possibility of armed conflict when public opinion opposed military expenditures and seemed obsessed with the benefits of neutralism and perhaps by self-righteousness. These and other contradictory factors of our national life and well-being are touched upon in this chapter, as are the steps taken to reconcile opposing considerations.
For a dozen years or more after World War I the United States followed a program of drastic retrenchment in military preparedness. Much of this was quite in order because we had built up a gigantic military machine by the end of World War I, and there were in various stages of completion large naval building programs. But public opinion demanded much greater military curtailment to demonstrate America's support of the worldwide yearning for peace as exemplified by the various peace-keeping treaties of those years.
Also, it is interesting to note that in the mid 's the Nye Committee of the United States Senate held numerous hearings to show that war was caused in large part by the manufacturers and vendors of armament and military equipment. It was pointed out that drastic reduction in the purchase of such materials would presumably tend toward peace.
Many peace organizations were active during those times in promoting general disarmament. In the absence of any over-all agreement among the world powers there was a strong feeling for "disarmament by example," the theory being that other nations would probably follow the strongest. Professional propagandists were likewise busy. The result was that throughout the 's the military forces of the United States were steadily reduced in effectiveness. Very few new ships were authorized, and manning levels in the military services were greatly curtailed.
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In short, the military services existed on a starvation diet. However, when the economic depression began after , the nation was fortunate that a portion of the Congressional appropriations for the National Industrial Recovery Act was assigned to a rehabilitation program in ship construction, but not without opposition from well-meaning organizations devoted to the hope of peace through disarmament.
Included in this program of ship construction were a number of major vessels. The design and construction of such ships requires four to five years. But some of these became available and were of inestimable value in the early days of World War II. An important national benefit was the reactivation of the famished American shipbuilding trade which thus was available for the gigantic programs of production in the days ahead.
At this time there was no comprehension of the magnitude of the military needs which shortly would be thrust upon us. Of course, there was very little concern that such needs would require several years of lead time for the design, planning, development, and manufacture, or for the training of personnel for operation. The large portion of our population was determined to avoid war at any cost, and they were quite sure that the best way to avoid war was to avoid preparing for war. Naturally the Congress reflected the viewpoint of public opinion. Although supporting most of the President's recommendations for national defense, in the late 's it acted otherwise repeatedly.
For example, in the House of Representatives barely defeated the proposed Ludlow constitutional amendment which would have required a popular vote as a prerequisite to a declaration of war by the Congress. Except for the strong representations made by the President and the Secretary of State this proposal would probably have been passed. Near the end of Secretary of War Woodring reported that despite improvements made, the United States stood eighteenth in relative strength among the standing armies of the world.
In Congress refused to. President Roosevelt wrote to the Speaker of the House on 6 January , and Secretary Hull warned on 8 January that this proposal would hamstring the Government.
Although the Congress approved calling up for active duty the Reserves and the National Guard, in August it was required that they be used only within the Western Hemisphere or in United States territories. As late as August Congress passed the first peacetime Selective Service and Training Act in our history by a small margin, but with the same restrictions as for the Reserves and National Guard. At about the same time Congress defeated a bill for improving the defenses of Guam, on the basis that the United States should not do anything to provoke or irritate Japan.
So while some progress was made in building up the national defense forces, public opinion was divided as to the advisability of doing anything which had the appearance of warlike measures. Except for the strong leadership and insistence of the President and Secretary of State, backed by U. In a world beset with ever-increasing international outlawry, the diplomatic workload of a leading world power committed to peace and legal procedures among nations was enormous.
The United States exerted every means to impress upon the offending nations the importance of peaceful processes and the avoidance of violence. Secretary of State Cordell Hull was a patient and reasonable man. He continuously emphasized the inviolability of treaties and agreements among the nations if peace and orderly progress were to be maintained. The logic of his arguments was clear to most people. And let it be said that his work during those critical years bears the stamp of excellence in building a framework of definite action which later could be properly taken.
Together with President Roosevelt, the State Department took progressive steps toward exposing international outlawry, and in time toward taking specific action to oppose it. We might list a few of the most important steps which were taken. Many of the specific measures taken pertain primarily to problems in the Atlantic, but of course are clearly related to the problems presented by the Japanese in the Pacific.
Freedom of trade and commercial activity as guaranteed by treaties and agreements were the subject of frequent notes and discussions. The situation became crucial when freedom of the seas became involved. Ultimately the United States took decisive action by instituting a naval patrol in the Atlantic in When public opinion seemed willing to overlook violations of American rights in Secretary Hull warned that our security would be menaced if we abandoned our legitimate principles because of fear or unwillingness.
Only by meeting our responsibilities and making our proper contributions to the firm establishment of a world order based on law "can we keep the problem of our own security in true perspective. When war broke in Europe in the United States declared its neutrality and also declared a Limited National Emergency.
The embargo on the export of arms under the Neutrality Act was repealed in November so that some aid could be rendered to Great Britain and France. In order to exert a restraining influence on Japan's warlike policies it was decided that the fleet exercises in May of would be held in the Hawaiian area. The Fleet remained in Hawaii after the maneuvers.
This was a diplomatic decision, which was not concurred by all military leaders. On 19 May , President Roosevelt said, "We are shocked and angered" by the over-running of the Lowlands by the Germans and he said that it is a mistaken idea that the American republics are wholly safe from the impact of the attacks on civilization in other parts of the world.
The American government. Secretary Hull's address in Washington, D. In September American Ambassador Grew reported that Japan felt that she had a "golden opportunity. She has been deterred from taking great liberties with interests of the United States because she respected our potential power, and she trampled on our rights in exact ratio to the strength of conviction that the United States public would not permit that power to be developed and used.
Embargoes and sanctions against Japan were frequently considered and carefully evaluated as to risk of provocation. However, in July the Export Control Act authorized the President in the interest of national defense to prohibit or curtail the export of certain war materials, including scrap metal and oil.
In January President Roosevelt declared in his State of the Union Message to Congress that American security was threatened, that we supported resolute people resisting aggression, and that our own security would "never permit us to acquiesce in a peace dictated by aggressors or sponsored by appeasers. In March Congress passed the Lend Lease Act and appropriated seven billion dollars to aid friendly nations. President Roosevelt made a statement that this action ended any compromise with tyranny and the forces of oppression.
Following attacks on American merchant and naval ships in September and October President Roosevelt stated: "History has recorded who fired the first shot. On 21 October Secretary Hull stated with regard to the Congressional authorization for American merchant vessels to carry cargoes to belligerents that the "paramount principle of national policy is the preserva-.
On 17 August President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull conferred with Japanese diplomats and delivered a note which contained the statement that the government of the United States "finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and the American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.
On 1 December Secretary Hull stated to Japanese diplomats that the United States would give all the materials Japan requires if the Japanese leaders will show some movement toward peace and discontinue bellicose threats and bluster. Thus it is seen that American diplomacy was active throughout the decade preceding Pearl Harbor, in endeavoring to restrain the aggressors on the one hand, and on the other, to educate the American people regarding the issues at stake and the threat to their freedom and security.
As the people became informed of the progress of events in Europe and Japan, and were alerted to the effects on American interests and principles, they gradually assumed stronger views against the three aggressor nations. Yet despite the actions of those nations, the clear mandate of the people was to refrain from war or the appearance of war. There were wide differences of opinion as to the rightness or wrongness of every nation's actions, including our own. Some of these were based on race, nationality, or personal experience.
Others were influenced by paid propaganda outputs in this country. But the great majority of the people were sincere and honest in their desire to avoid warfare if at all possible, and were willing to make concessions and even sacrifices to that end. Such persons criticized the State Department for writing notes rather than acting forthrightly and forcibly. The unprovoked bombing of USS Panay and three merchant ships in by the Japanese hardened the American viewpoint, as did the brutal attacks on missionary hospitals in China, and the terror-bombing of the Chinese people.
There was strong opposition to the exportation of scrap metal and oil to Japan before these items were embargoed in and especially when these commodities were in short supply in the United States. Yet Ambassador Grew stated that economic sanctions were more likely to cause war than to avoid it. This was one of the dilemmas which the Administration had to face. The Japanese, he explained, could not be bluffed or forced into submission.
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They would not "back down" as the Oriental psychology would consider this a "loss of face. By the great majority of our people were quite aware of Japan's unprincipled behavior, but still regarded the Japanese people with some sympathy and with considerable admiration for their industriousness, objectiveness, arid national loyalty.
But the ever-increasing tempo of Japan's depredations and the belligerent demands of their government changed attitudes of sympathy and admiration into anxiety and antipathy. When Japan took virtually full control of Indo-China in the summer of and demanded that Thailand grant special concessions, the American people approved our imposition of an oil embargo. Nevertheless public opinion tried hard to take these aggressions in stride, and it remained for the Japanese to solidify public opinion completely by the surprise attack on the American flag at Pearl Harbor.
The American public seemed in large part to be naive regarding the full implications of the European War and the Sino-Japanese War. Our high government officials, however, were quite aware of the threats to American interests and eventual security. It soon became crystal clear that the basic contest was between the forces of predatory authoritarianism and the free. Therefore, regardless of personal attachment to one country or another, the effort and influence of the United States were naturally directed toward restraining the predatory powers and assisting the free nations.
This diplomatic position became increasingly active and forceful each year as events became more threatening.
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Our endeavors to render material support to the beleaguered free nations required some military protection. As the contest widened, the need for defense indicated the importance of greater military potency. Thus the American stance against world aggression gradually developed from the diplomatic stage to the economic, and finally to the military, culminating in the United States becoming, clearly, if not formally, allied with the free nations against the Axis Powers.
We have already mentioned some of the more significant measures of diplomacy; now we might consider a few of the more important steps taken to render assistance to the friendly nations. American trade with China had been of importance to both countries for many years, and was essential to China in resisting Japan's depredations. From the start of the conflict we furnished assistance to China by shipping important materials to meet economic and military requirements. Such assistance to China was characterized by Japan as "an unfriendly act.
The Neutrality Acts of and placed a rigid embargo on the export of arms to all belligerents, and thus had an injurious effect on friendly nations which were comparatively deficient in military equipment with which to resist the aggressors. At various times President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull endeavored to persuade Congress to amend the Acts favorably to the victimized nations, but to no avail until November when the Acts were partially repealed. Although the Congress continued to stand firm for military neutrality, the apathy and complacency of the people were challenged and gradually broken down because of the shockingly predatory events abroad.
In June President Roosevelt reported that the United States would provide surplus material resources to Great Britain and France, and pointed out that this was in our self interest. In justifying this action he stated that we as a nation were concerned that "military and naval victory for the gods of force and hate would endanger the institutions of democracy in the western world," and that our sympathies were with these nations that were giving their lifeblood in combat against these forces.
In September the American government agreed with Great Britain to transfer fifty old-type destroyers in exchange for long-term leases of certain bases in the Western Atlantic and Caribbean. These bases would be essential in case of war, which they eventually proved to be. In December it was plain that the European aggressors intended to dominate all of Europe and ultimately the rest of the world. President Roosevelt proclaimed that the United States would act as the "Arsenal of Democracy," and stated that we must help defend the free world by furnishing needed materials.
In January the President asked Congress to authorize the lending of arms and other assistance to such nations when this was vital to the interests of the United States. Despite the bitter protests of isolationists Congress passed the Lend Lease Act in March and appropriated seven billion dollars to put it into effect. This Act permitted all direct military aid to Great Britain.
By the loss of British ships to German submarines exceeded the rate of production in the shipyards of both Great Britain and the United States. In order to deliver to Great Britain the material aid required, the United States instituted a naval patrol force to protect British ships in the Western Atlantic. By November it was clear that the survival of Great Britain was essential to the whole free world, and therefore the United States removed virtually all restrictions on arms shipments to that nation. In spite of continued protests of Japan we had for several years assisted China by furnishing military equipment for shipment over the Burma Road, which by was the only open route to China as all others had been blockaded by Japan.
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The military capabilities of the United States in the early 's were small compared to what might be required to match the powerful forces of the Axis. This fact was fully realized by responsible government officials, but public sentiment was quite fixed in opposition to any warlike gestures, including the buildup of armament. Furthermore, the economic depression. Yet, paradoxically, it was the depression which permitted significant improvement in preparedness. This was because the National Industrial Recovery Act provided funds for industrial activity which would give jobs to the unemployed.
President Roosevelt knew that the building of armaments, particularly ships, made jobs in nearly every phase of industry, and therefore in he exercised the authority granted by Congress and ordered the construction of thirty-two naval vessels. This was the first significant step in preparing for the needs of World War II, and hindsight proves that it was a fortunate and indispensable step. Other steps were taken as the grim events abroad pressed on the national consciousness and brought a change in the public attitude toward military preparedness. Some of the more important were the following:.
In the Vinson-Trammel Naval Bill authorized the navy to build up to treaty limitations. This did not provide funds for construction but indicated Congressional opinion as to the need for correcting our naval deficiencies. In President Roosevelt announced that the Navy was proceeding with the construction of two new battleships, the first since the treaty.
The Army also received new equipment, and an increase in officers and men from , to a new limit of , In his January message to Congress the President recommended increasing our defenses to insure reasonable security against worldwide pressures and assaults. Congress authorized a twenty percent increase in ships for the Navy and appropriated for two new battleships and two aircraft carriers. Debate in Congress showed that much doubt existed on the need for these increases, and some isolationist groups suspected that the real purpose was to aid Great Britain.
Secretary Hull replied that neither extreme internationalism or extreme isolationism was desired, but that inaction meant aiding the lawless nations. Again, in his January message to Congress, the President recommended further strengthening of the national defense, especially in air power, and the mobilization of industry for quantity production. When France sued for an armistice with Germany in June the United States insisted that the French fleet should not be surrendered to Germany, and received assurances accordingly.
Just before the surrender of France in June President Roosevelt asked Congress for authority to build 50, military airplanes, and stated to Congress that nations unable to defend themselves were easily subjugated. Old defense systems, he pointed out, were inadequate if American liberties and principles were to be maintained. Following the fall of France the President requested Congress to appropriate five billion dollars for further increases in defense.
This was granted on 27 August At the same time Congress authorized calling up the Reserves and National Guard for active duty. In July , forty-five additional warships were ordered for the Navy Department. In the summer of the President recommended to Congress the authorization for a "Two Ocean Navy," which was approved. The first peacetime Selective Service and Training Act in United States history was passed in September , and in August , when the international situation was very foreboding, Congress extended the period of service to one and one-half years.
But this was done by only a one vote margin in the House of Representatives. In keeping with Congressional authorizations and appropriations for the building up of national defense, many important steps were taken in and to improve American power on land, sea, and air. For instance, there were ordered or authorized for the Navy in With the exception of the larger battleships and the battle cruisers most of these vessels were expedited following the Pearl Harbor attack, and together with other ships which were ordered later, formed the irresistible force which vanquished the Japanese Navy.
It was restricted in area and had only one access to the open sea. Due to limited area it was necessary for ships to be clustered rather than dispersed. It was far removed from the source of essential supplies, such as oil, food, mechanical materials, technical installations, and industrial capacity. Essential services for regular fleet activities and exercises were in short supply. These included tugs, target practice facilities, and a host of other things required by ships of the fleet. Hawaii lacked adequate housing and recreational facilities for military personnel.
The great majority of fleet personnel were separated from their families and friends over long periods of time. This was an unsuitable morale situation in peacetime. The defenses of Pearl Harbor were almost non-existent. This was an Army responsibility, but the Army lacked the wherewithal to provide much defense, especially in anti-aircraft batteries and pursuit aircraft.
For these reasons, and others, the Commander-in-Chief of the U. Fleet protested strenuously and repeatedly the decision to base the fleet at Pearl Harbor instead of Southern California. He doubted that the presence of the fleet at Pearl Harbor was a deterrent to the Japanese, and pointed out. The final result was that he, Admiral Joseph O. Richardson, was relieved of command on 1 February and was succeeded by Admiral Husband E. At that time the fleet became the U. Pacific Fleet, and the separate Atlantic Fleet was established.
It might be well to mention here that Admiral Richardson felt that the fleet was not prepared for war and was seriously lacking in logistic support, especially oil tankers. Despite the inadequacies at Pearl Harbor it is correct to say that during the year or so before the Japanese attack many of the handicaps were partially overcome through persistent and hard work. In retrospect, it appears that even though Pearl Harbor was in many ways an unsatisfactory fleet base, the fact that the Fleet was there prevented the Japanese from initially occupying Hawaii and Midway, thereby using them later as bases to intercept our naval forces.
Most importantly, after the war started Pearl Harbor became the largest and most efficient naval base in world history. Its value as a springboard for mounting our unparalleled offensive actions against the Japanese was incalculable. As has been indicated, the military defenses of Pearl Harbor were quite meager. The development of a great military base takes years of planning, coordination, copious funds, and continual construction, installation, and support.
Such development required close coordination of the various military services. This, of course, can be quite difficult in the face of separate evaluations both in Washington and on the scene. However, it is noteworthy that, contrary to views expressed by much of the news media after the Japanese attack, there was a high degree of cooperation and coordination between the Army and the Navy in the years prior to the Pearl Harbor episode.
This was a friendly and hard working joint effort. Here are some of the results of that effort:. Hawaii was defended by Army forces including heavy and light artillery, infantry, and air force. The Air Corps was part of the Army at that time. The first two were principally bomber fields, while Wheeler operated pursuit planes.
All fields were in process of development and were training personnel to operate planes on a combat basis. Hickam Field was busy receiving new B's from the West Coast, outfitting and commissioning them, and flying them to bolster the defenses of Wake Island and the Philippines. It is estimated that only about ninety-four Army Air Force planes were ready for combat by 7 December.
Many of the planes were under overhaul or having new equipment installed. The Army had 26 fixed three-inch anti-aircraft guns and 60 mobile three-inch guns. None of the latter were emplaced as the assigned locations for wartime emplacements were on private property. Also thirty-seven millimeter guns were assigned, but only 20 were delivered, and these were without ammunition.
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