As we can see, Sustitia 1 is often in pain or distressed, and this psychological and physical suffering is a direct result of the way in which her human owners keep her. Theories in applied animal ethics tend to include a prohibition against causing unnecessary pain and suffering to animals.
As things stand in this example, it seems reasonable to say that Sustitia 1 is being harmed by her owners, given that these husbandry conditions lead her to suffer almost continuously. The harm that Sustitia 1 undergoes is by no means negligible. On the contrary, a plausible case could be made to argue that a fundamental right of Sustitia 1 —the right not to be subjected to extensive and unnecessary suffering—is being violated. We do not want to lessen the importance of this harm.
Of course, one could argue that, on account of being a farm animal, Sustitia 1 is also being harmed because she has had her freedom taken away from her, or because she is being commodified or exploited. These are fair points, but we want to bracket the harm that comes from her overall life experience and focus on the specific harm that results directly from her husbandry conditions: the inadequate flooring, the restricted space, and so on. The latter is a harm that takes the form of a subjective negative experience. Because these conditions make her suffer, and her suffering is a bad thing, Sustitia 1 is harmed by them.
The harm that Sustitia 1 undergoes as a direct result of her husbandry conditions consists of her suffering. It is a welfare problem. Our characterisation of Sustitia 1 has not provided us with any reason to think that she is a moral subject, for she has been described as a fairly simple individual with entirely self-centred interests.
Accordingly, we shall now refer to her as Sustitia 2. What makes her different from Sustitia 1 is that Sustitia 2 does not just suffer due to her own life conditions, she is also concerned with the well-being of the sows and piglets in her environment. She is surrounded by sows who are kept in the same conditions as her, and who are thus displaying continuous signs of distress. She also has to witness piglets undergoing tail-docking, teeth-clipping, and castration without anaesthesia or analgesia, 10 and she is not indifferent to their pain and distress.
Sustitia 2 is characterised by the possession of a mechanism in her brain that ensures that whenever she witnesses a conspecific in distress, she too undergoes a form of distress 11 that 1 is intentionally directed at the distress of the conspecific, and 2 has an urge to engage in affiliative behaviour built into it. This means that, when Sustitia 2 witnesses the distress of any of the conspecifics in her environment, she automatically feels distressed about their distress , and this reliably compels her to comfort them.
Rowlands , The possession of sympathy entails a sensitivity to the morally relevant property of distress. From an internal perspective, we can say that, when Sustitia 2 comforts her conspecifics, she is doing so for morally right reasons, since her sympathy implies experiencing as bad something that is, in fact, bad i. Instead, it is a systematic reaction grounded in the operations of a reliable internal mechanism—one which, we are supposing, is shared by all members of her species. This situation is repeated over and over again.
Whenever Sustitia 2 sees, hears, or smells any of her conspecifics in distress, she wants to comfort them, but is prevented from doing so on account of the existence of this barrier. Given that, under normal circumstances, her sympathy would result in affiliative behaviour, we can say that the barrier prevents this moral motivation from operating fully or correctly. Her sympathy encompasses feelings of distress, so she will suffer whenever she perceives a conspecific in distress. We are going to argue that, in such a situation, Sustitia 2 would be the subject of a type of harm that would not be captured by merely saying that she is suffering; that her experiential welfare is being compromised.
This something more that is going on stems from the fact that Sustitia 2 is being prevented from exercising her moral subjecthood. In the following section, we present a way of capturing the harm that this implies. The defence of this idea, which will take place in Theoretical Implications: Moving Beyond Welfarism section, will rely on the use of an alternative normative framework that can capture the harm we are speaking of. Rather than attempting to build from scratch a theory that can capture our intuitions, we shall make use of a well-known theory that has already proved quite solid: the capabilities approach, which was introduced into animal ethics by Nussbaum , We have chosen this theory due to 1 its individualistic character, 2 the importance it gives to social abilities, and 3 its reliance on a pluralistic theory of well-being, all of which makes it a perfect candidate to use in support of our argument.
Since a defence of this theory is beyond the scope of this paper, we will proceed by assuming its correctness. With this in mind, let us now introduce the capabilities approach, and show how it can be used to conceptualise the harm that affects Sustitia 2 when she is prevented from exercising her sympathy. Because the capabilities approach finds ethical significance in the flourishing of basic innate capabilities—those that are evaluated as both good and central […]—it will also find harm in the thwarting or blighting of those capabilities.
More complex forms of life have more and more complex capabilities to be blighted, so they can suffer more and different types of harm. Level of life is relevant not because it gives different species differential worth per se, but because the type and degree of harm a creature can suffer varies with its form of life. Nussbaum , Capabilities, then, are understood as those things one is able to do and to be. With this in mind, there are two ways we can characterise moral emotions in terms of capabilities, depending on whether we focus on what one is able to do because of them or what one is able to be thanks to them.
If we decide to conceptualise moral emotions as primarily motivations to engage in moral behaviour, then they are not capabilities in themselves, but rather cognitive-affective mechanisms that ground capabilities. Thus, Sustitia 2 might be said to have the capability to care for others because she possesses sympathy. But we can also understand moral emotions as capabilities themselves, if we were to conceptualise them as primarily character traits, that is, as dispositions to feel and behave in certain ways. Sympathy, for instance, can be understood as the capability to be sympathetic, that is, as a character trait that disposes one to feel distressed in the presence of others in distress and consequently engage in affiliative behaviour.
Moral emotions can thus be understood as either grounding certain capabilities, or as capabilities themselves. For ease of exposition, and given that nothing turns on this largely terminological choice, we shall opt for the second conceptualisation. This is, in fact, the view adopted by Nussbaum herself see, e. Accordingly, those moral emotions that ground positive forms of care for others—not just sympathy, but also compassion, patience, tolerance, gratitude, etc. If moral emotions akin to sympathy are indeed basic capabilities, this means that the individuals who possess them are entitled to lead lives in which the exercise of these capabilities remains possible for them.
We are now at a point where we can start to see the full dimension of the ethical problems implicit in the example of Sustitia 2. As we saw, whenever an animal is treated in a way that thwarts one or several of her basic capabilities, she is being harmed. There are two ways in which this thwarting can occur: 1 an animal can be precluded from the possibility of exercising her capability, or 2 she can have her capability taken away from her.
Sustitia 2 still possesses sympathy, but she lacks the possibility of exercising it because of the existence of a physical barrier. Despite not being able to do it, she is still capable of caring for others. She still has her capability, but cannot exercise it. An example of 2 might occur if Sustitia 2 became habituated to the frequent presence of distress cues in her surroundings, to the point where she no longer felt concerned about her conspecifics.
She would have become incapable of caring for others. She would have lost her capability. In both cases, Sustitia 2 is being harmed by whoever has placed her in this situation, because her capability has been thwarted as a result. In the following section, we offer the reasons why the moral problems involved in the thwarting of her moral capability cannot be accounted for in terms of welfare alone. In this section, we offer four considerations that support the claim that the harm affecting Sustitia 2 cannot be fully captured in terms of experiential welfare.
Because we have not given a defence of the capabilities approach, what we will put forward cannot be considered a conclusive argument. While they ultimately rely on intuitions, we hope to show that these reasons are powerful enough to cast serious doubts on the ability of welfarism to rise up to the challenge. In the case of Sustitia 2 , this treatment is also doing something else, namely, preventing her from exercising her moral capability. Sustitia 2 , like Sustitia 1 , is harmed because her welfare is being impaired, but she is also harmed because her moral capability is being thwarted.
The harm involved in the thwarting of her moral capability adds to the harm involved in her loss of welfare. Sustitia 2 is, so to speak, doubly harmed. Our claim is, rather, that if we were to only speak in terms of welfare, we would not capture this additional harm, and so we would only have a partial account of how Sustitia 2 is being wronged.
It is simply different. A purely welfarist analysis would distract us from the fact that, under normal circumstances—i. If it does not, then arguably there is no real attachment. Under certain conditions, grief is the right thing to feel. Whether or not this means that grief is a constituent part of the attachment seems largely a matter of stipulation, but it does seem right to say that if you value the attachment, then you have to value the grief that comes with it. This is what caring consists of for Sustitia 2.
We cannot separate it from her distress. They are inextricably intertwined. But, of course, the fact that comforting another can constitute something valuable for a social animal has to be put into perspective, and the circumstances that give rise to this behaviour must be taken into account for a proper ethical assessment to be reached.
A person who has had a life of misfortune, with very little opportunities, and rather little hope, may be more easily reconciled to deprivations than others reared in more fortunate and affluent circumstances. The metric of happiness may, therefore, distort the extent of deprivation, in a specific and biased way. Sen , Anyone who considers sympathy and caringness to be intrinsically valuable character traits must conclude that the welfarist analysis of this example is misguided.
The habituation process is not beneficial, even if it results in lesser suffering. The habituation process is a further harm that is inflicted upon Sustitia 2 , because an individual who would naturally be sympathetic and caring has become callous by way of the agency of another i.
This harm cannot be accounted for in terms of welfare. In contrast, the capabilities approach allows us to speak of harm, not only when a capability is prevented from being exercised, but also when it is taken away in its entirety. We can thus continue to speak of harm, even though she is no longer suffering. Welfarists were forced into a moral dilemma when a strain of blind chickens that displayed less signs of distress under crowded conditions was accidentally produced.
This sparked an on-going debate on whether we should deliberately disenhance farm animals by use of biotechnology in order to make them incapable of suffering. If harm depends solely on suffering, then producing animals that cannot suffer should appear as innocuous, even desirable. And yet, this seems highly counter-intuitive. Reflecting upon the moral capabilities of animals can shed light on at least part of the reason why the biotechnological disenhancement of farm animals would be wrong.
To see this, consider an individual we can call Sustitia 3.
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What distinguishes her from Sustitia 2 is that, when Sustitia 3 was an embryo, she was subjected to a process of genetic engineering aimed at depriving her of the capacity to feel distress. As a consequence of this process of disenhancement, Sustitia 3 cannot feel distress, and consequently, she cannot feel sympathy either, for the latter is dependent on the former.
From a purely welfarist perspective, Sustitia 3 would not have been harmed by this disenhancement process, since she is, ex hypothesi , incapable of suffering. The capabilities approach, however, allows us to specify at least part of the harm inflicted upon Sustitia 3 , by saying that this disenhancement has deprived her of the capability to care for others.
Sustitia 3 has been forced into a life that contains one less type of good: a life in which she will never get to form attachments and care for others. Her life is poorer as a result, and so it is a worse life. In this section, as a last step in our argument, we will evaluate some of the human practices involving animals in light of the considerations we have made. Due to space constraints, we can just give a rough idea of the relevance of our theoretical claims for the field of applied animal ethics and human—animal interactions.
Moreover, we are only going to consider those animals that are under direct human care, even though Nussbaum hints at the possibility that the capabilities approach may give rise to certain duties towards wild animals see Nussbaum , ff. Throughout this section, we will often refer to certain practices that we consider ethically questionable as a whole like the raising of animals for food , but we will assess them only with respect to the noxious effect they may have upon the moral subjecthood of the animals involved.
There are many further ethical concerns with respect to these practices that are well known and have been widely discussed in the literature, but we will proceed by bracketing them and focusing on the issue at hand. This is not meant as a way of lessening the importance of these ethical concerns.
Rather, our ultimate aim is to contribute a new aspect to the ethical debate surrounding these practices and perhaps strengthen the case against certain ones. Until now, we have refrained from referring to real animals and instead used hypothetical constructs to illustrate our point. In what follows, we will refer to actual animal species whose moral capabilities have only recently begun to be studied if at all. While we still lack the sort of evidence to confidently attribute moral capacities to them, we will proceed by assuming that they are moral subjects, in order to identify potential harms that we may be inadvertently inflicting on them.
As we saw, an animal can have her moral capabilities thwarted 1 if she is precluded from the possibility of exercising them, or 2 if her moral capabilities are taken away from her. We shall now consider how these two forms of thwarting may occur in everyday human-animal interactions. Even though Sustitia 2 was an imaginary example, her life conditions may not differ much from those of real animals who are raised for food. As we have already pointed out, painful and distressing procedures in farm animal husbandry are abundant, and indeed, ethical concerns with respect to the methods involved in breeding, raising, handling, transporting, and slaughtering farm animals have been raised for decades e.
Rollin Due to the overcrowding that characterises intensive farming, these painful procedures will often take place while in the presence of conspecifics. This, however, is an issue that has received comparatively little attention. Only rather recently has it begun to be systematically addressed as a research topic. As usual, the focus of these studies has been the welfare problems involved in these situations.
As we have already explained, this might add a new dimension to the ways in which these animals are being harmed. Farm animals are not the only class of animals under human care that are often exposed to the distress of conspecifics. Lab animals, too, will frequently find themselves in similar situations. The procedures involved in experimental set-ups include handling the subjects, collecting blood samples, performing orogastric gavage a technique used to administer nutrients directly to the stomach via an oral tube Balcombe et al.
Other animals in the laboratory may have perceptual access to these processes and will most likely be prevented from interfering. We already have a significant amount of evidence suggesting that rodents undergo emotional contagion when in the presence of a conspecific in distress Knapska et al. Therefore, in this context it is also important to consider whether the animals are having their moral capabilities thwarted.
Many husbandry systems resort to the re-grouping, separation, or even isolation of animals, thus depriving them of this pre-condition, and potentially thwarting their moral capabilities. This sort of unstable social environment is very common in farms. Farm animals are grouped and re-grouped according to productivity and reproductive state. This could constitute a problem, for instance, for dairy cows, who are gregarious animals and develop complex social relationships, characterised by feeding and resting together, or by engaging in allogrooming.
Gutmann et al. They conclude that it is actually long-term familiarity that creates preferred social partners in dairy cows.
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But if farm animals are frequently re-grouped, the only social relationships possible, then, might be short-term relationships. They lose their preferred social partners, and this may hinder the flourishing of their moral capabilities, for evidence suggests that animals have a higher probability of engaging in caring and helping behaviour when they are familiar with the other subject Cronin ; Bartal et al. Several of the housing conditions found in factory farms, such as sow stalls and farrowing crates, have been severely criticised, amongst other things, because they result in an enforced isolation from conspecifics see e.
Rollin , especially chapter The thwarting of the moral capabilities of these isolated animals adds a new dimension to the welfare problems that such housing methods cause. Other animals under human care are also deprived of the stable social environment that would be a pre-condition for exercising their moral capabilities. Zoo animals are often separated from each other due to space constraints if families become too big , and rehoused to other zoos because of breeding programs. Lab animals might be kept in sterile, single housing due to the requirements of a controlled experimental setting.
And even if some legislation tries to put a stop to it, companion animals are often kept in isolation from conspecifics, even highly social animals, like parrots, which has been shown to have harming effects Aydinonat et al. Furthermore, companion animals kept in shelters, such as dogs, might very often experience the breaking up of social relationships when individuals of their group are rehomed. In this light, the common practice of rescuing dogs from the streets may not be as innocuous as is usually considered, as these animals lose their familiar environment and very likely all their well-known partners.
They might be brought to a foster home with no other companion dog around them—a situation that could possibly mean fewer opportunities for their moral capabilities to be exercised.
In sum, if the animals in these different examples are subjects with complex social lives that include moral lives, then re-grouping, separating, and isolating them may disrupt or preclude the appearance of those bonds that are a pre-condition for the exercise of their moral capabilities. In the practices that we have considered until now, the animals involved are, to a bigger or lesser extent, prevented from exercising their moral capabilities. Some human—animal interactions involve breeding, training, conditioning, or modifying the animals with the aim of eliminating some or all of their moral capabilities.
The most obvious example here is that of fighting animals. Indeed, the training and also breeding 21 that fighting dogs undergo aims precisely at enhancing their aggressiveness and eliminating any potential caring response to a conspecific in distress Kalof and Iliopoulou Cattle used for bullfighting are also selectively bred to enhance aggressiveness Silva et al.
Indeed, several psychologists have undertaken this as a research project. Harlow raised rhesus monkeys from birth onward in bare wire cages, facing partial or total maternal deprivation. He would offer them the choice between two inanimate surrogate mothers: one made of cloth and the other of wire. The infants were found to insistently seek the cloth mothers, even when they were designed to shake them, stab them with blunt spikes, or push them away via a mechanical flap.
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They are heavily criticised from a bioethical perspective for being both unnecessary and cruel Novak ; Medical Research Modernization Committee Hernandez-Lallement et al. Our argument helps to shed some light on the ethical problems that are, in fact, involved in such experiments. As in the hypothetical example of Sustitia 3 , some human practices may destroy the moral capabilities of animals indirectly, as an unintended side effect of a treatment that has other aims.
For example, there have been reports of rats becoming habituated to distress cues from conspecifics after repeated exposure to them during pro-sociality experiments Church The mother-infant relationship is also artificially terminated in the case of many farm, zoo, and lab animals, as well as for some companion animals, e. As the Harlow experiments exemplify, the absence of an appropriate mother-infant bond may have profound effects on the development of the moral capabilities of animals. And lastly, the social isolation that can be found in many farms, zoos, labs, and even some households, may not just prevent the animals from exercising their moral capabilities, but also, in the long run, effectively eliminate their capacity to care for others.
The humans who are causally responsible should, arguably, be blamed for this harm, even if it was unintended. This would especially be the case if the humans were aware of this side effect, and simply assumed it as an inevitable consequence. When we initially set out to investigate the ethical implications of considering that some animals are moral subjects, we expected it to be a conceptual exploration, with little relevance outside the proverbial armchair.
Rather the opposite turned out to be the case. We have found many contexts, including routine procedures in farms, labs, and in our homes, where humans potentially interfere with, hinder, or destroy the moral capabilities of animals. And by opening up to other normative theories besides the capabilities approach we could perhaps find further examples. We leave that to future research, and hope to at least have given a good sense of how the possibility of moral subjecthood in animals creates conceptual space for a type of harm that has been little, if at all, discussed, and that may be very real and important.
Whether or not welfarists can find a way of capturing this harm remains to be seen, but we hope to have convincingly shown how, in its purely hedonistic formulation, it is unlikely that welfarism can account for this harm. The idea that some animals have some degree of moral agency has also been defended by other authors, such as Sapontzis , Pluhar , De Grazia , Shapiro and Andrews and Gruen In addition to these systematic studies, which document animals engaging in apparently moral behaviour towards both humans and conspecifics, one can easily come across many relevant anecdotes.
For instance, there are reports of dolphins helping other dolphins Park et al. While the possibility of animal morality is gaining increasing support from scholars, there are authors who have expressed dissenting views, on both empirical and conceptual grounds. Penn et al. Schwartz et al. There are also conceptual critiques that focus on whether these studies provide evidence of specifically moral motivations see e.
For a comprehensive overview of the conceptual disagreements in the animal morality debate, see Fitzpatrick This line of thinking is deeply rooted in different cultures. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, for example, human superiority has traditionally been interpreted as granting a right to dominate and exploit nature. Some modern theologians, however, argue that human superiority should instead be interpreted as implying a duty of stewardship e.
Linzey and Cohn-Sherbok One could object here by saying that full moral status depends on full-fledged moral agency, which can be plausibly regarded as an exclusively human domain barring any extraterrestrial moral agents. We thus take welfarism to be a monistic theory that equates well-being with positive hedonistic welfare, and we understand pluralistic theories as defending the existence of other prudential goods that contribute to well-being.
Following Schmidt , , welfare scientists can be broadly categorised into those that focus on the subjective aspects of animal well-being e. Duncan and those that focus on objective aspects, such as biological functioning, the ability to cope with the environment e. Broom , or quantifiable measures of animal welfare such as behavioural indicators e. Dawkins However, there are also welfare scientists that stress both e.
Webster Our critique of welfarism in this paper is directed at those scholars that focus on the subjective aspects. It is important to note, though, that in animal welfare science subjective quality of life is often considered a very dominant component of animal well-being. Even though Sustitia 1 is a hypothetical example, her life conditions do not differ much from those of sows in industrial farms. See EFSA for a comprehensive review of the welfare problems involved in pig husbandry.
What constitutes unnecessary suffering is, for sure, debatable. Farm animals are routinely subjected to a series of painful or stressful procedures that are deemed necessary out of economic interests. Farrowing crates, for instance, are used to prevent the sows from rolling over and crushing the piglets. Providing such environmental enrichment, together with the extra space required, would entail extra costs for the farmers, thus ultimately raising the price of pork. It depends on the normative ethics one subscribes to.
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In contrast, from the perspective of other ethical accounts including other consequentialist approaches, and for sure an animal rights approach , this might not be permissible, as the interest in not suffering ranks in principle higher than economic interests at least as long as the latter do not constitute a matter of life or death for the farmer or consumer.
In this respect, these hypothetical piglets are not so different from real piglets, as these are all routine procedures in livestock management RSPCA Sustitia 2 may share this capacity with actual pigs. Recent studies suggest that pigs possess a capacity for emotional contagion, for they tend to display behaviours associated with negative emotions e.
In fact, she also appears to share this capacity with chimpanzees Parr , geese Wascher et al. Studies on emotional contagion often involve animals undergoing negative stimuli in order to determine whether the witnessing animals get stressed, too. While this is an issue that goes beyond the scope of this paper, we would like to note that these sorts of experiments may be ethically problematic and should not remain unquestioned.
There is, however, a big definitional debate surrounding both sympathy and empathy, which we do not intend to take a stand on. Indeed, this is the usual effect when animals engage in affiliative behaviour directed at a distressed conspecific see, e. In fact, the authors themselves hint at this idea Purves and Delon , Note that this is a conceptual, not empirical, claim. One could object that this first consideration is question-begging.
Of course, in a sense, it is, but that does not necessarily render it useless. By putting forward our intuition that Sustitia 2 is harmed in two different ways, we are making explicit a claim that a welfarist would have to renounce. Those readers who share our intuition may find this a compelling reason to set welfarism aside. Rats given anxiolytics have been found less likely to help a conspecific in need Ben-Ami Bartal et al.
We deliberately point to this because a possible counter-argument might be to say that this implies that the ethical problem of piglet castration could be solved if the sows were allowed to comfort them afterwards. Of course, we believe that such a counter-argument is flawed. There are several further considerations that need to be taken into account. In addition, witnessing the suffering of piglets is probably not an isolated event for most sows but something they have to face rather often.
A sow currently gives birth to 10—16 piglets per litter, producing 25—30 pigs per year Kim et al. All male piglets are normally castrated without pain relief. Additionally, most piglets undergo other painful routine procedures like teeth-clipping or tail-docking, abrupt weaning, re-grouping and transport. The welfare problem might be so big as to outweigh any considerations regarding the intrinsic value of caring for others. See Thompson and Ferrari for an overview of this debate. Instead, we would have to say that selective breeding changes the capabilities of the species or the population.
We believe that this is nevertheless an instance of harm, because of the intentional manner in which this breeding is performed and the goal behind it. We are assuming that the capabilities approach can accommodate harm inflicted on the capabilities of populations, as well as individuals, but this is a matter that merits further discussion.
The authors would like to thank the attendants, and especially Mark Rowlands, for their helpful feedback. This paper also hugely benefitted from comments by Samuel Camenzind, Herwig Grimm, Stefan Schwarzburg, and various anonymous reviewers. Skip to main content Skip to sections. Advertisement Hide. Download PDF. Open Access. First Online: 27 September It is generally assumed that the kind of ethical treatment a certain being is entitled to depends upon the type of being she is.
While this idea has been questioned by some authors e. Sustitia 2 : A Moral Subject Our characterisation of Sustitia 1 has not provided us with any reason to think that she is a moral subject, for she has been described as a fairly simple individual with entirely self-centred interests. Needless to say, if we are thinking of highly complex species, such as our own, the list of capabilities is immense. The key idea, for our purposes, is the following: Because the capabilities approach finds ethical significance in the flourishing of basic innate capabilities—those that are evaluated as both good and central […]—it will also find harm in the thwarting or blighting of those capabilities.
This was eloquently put by Sen: A person who has had a life of misfortune, with very little opportunities, and rather little hope, may be more easily reconciled to deprivations than others reared in more fortunate and affluent circumstances. Sen , 45 Likewise, in the case of animals, these coping mechanisms may develop and disguise the extent to which animals are harmed in a specific situation, which is one of the reasons why their suffering can be an unreliable measure of their well-being.
If Sustitia 2 eventually became habituated to the suffering of her conspecifics and no longer felt distressed when she perceived it, a welfarist would have to conclude that she is no longer being harmed. In fact, from a welfarist perspective, we would have to say that Sustitia 2 has been benefitted due to this habituation process, insofar as it has led her to stop suffering. Practices That Involve Animals Witnessing the Distress of Conspecifics Even though Sustitia 2 was an imaginary example, her life conditions may not differ much from those of real animals who are raised for food.
Practices That Eliminate the Moral Capabilities of Animals In the practices that we have considered until now, the animals involved are, to a bigger or lesser extent, prevented from exercising their moral capabilities. Andrews, Kristin, and Lori Gruen. Empathy in Other Apes. In Empathy and Morality , ed. Heidi Maibon, — New York: Oxford University Press. Google Scholar. In preparation. John Doris and Manuel Vargas. Anil, M.
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Paul L. Home Contact us Help Free delivery worldwide. Free delivery worldwide. Bestselling Series. Harry Potter. Popular Features. New Releases. Animal Rights: All That Matters. Description Animal Rights is a big deal. From animal testing to vegetarianism, and hunting to preservation of fish stocks, it's a topic that's always in the news. Mark Rowlands, author of The Philosopher and the Wolf, is the world's best known philosopher of animal rights. In this, the first introduction he has written to the topic, he starts by asking whether there is anything about humans that makes us psychologically or physiologically distinctive - so that there might be a moral justification for treating animals in a different way to how we treat humans.
From this foundation, he goes on to explore specific issues of eating animals, experimentation, pets, hunting, zoos, predation and engineering animals. He ends with a challenging argument of how an improved understanding of animal ethics can and should affect readers' choices. Other books in this series.
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