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Military Branch Services
They are substantively intertwined. Key Findings and Recommendations either rest on one or more underlying findings and recommendations in the report body or represent a finding and recommendation drawn from the substance of the report or a section as a whole. Where the former is the case, the pertinent findings and recommendations are noted in brackets. However, these priorities are closely tied to the force structure the Army chooses or is directed to implement.
Key Finding 1. Logistics activities within the Army do not receive the attention necessary to ensure the effective sustainment of operational forces on the battlefield over the long term. This is because, unlike things that directly affect combat effectiveness, it is difficult to understand the ultimate impact of logistics activities on Army capability. As a result, when systems are developed or plans are executed, the logistics enterprise is placed in a catch-up position, significantly reducing its ability to support the ongoing operations.
Capability requirements, along with off-the-shelf solutions that create logistics burdens, are outpacing the development and fielding of burden-reducing logistics and logistics-related technologies.
Key Recommendation 1. Senior Army leadership should ensure that adequate resources and priorities are given to logistics activities across the spectrum of Army activities, including research and development, analytical support, force structure, military education, and operational planning. Key Finding 2. As a matter of doctrine, bottled water is used in the initial stages of operations until the bulk purification, storage, and distribution of water can be established.
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The use of bottled water weighs heavily on the logistics systems, puts soldiers and civilians at risk to deliver it, and generates a significant waste burden. Because of the availability of contractor-provided bottled water in Iraq and Afghanistan, earlier peacekeeping missions, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, the Army reduced its organic active force capability to provide water at the point of need and is now heavily reliant on the use of bottled water.
Key Recommendation 2. The Army should rely on its existing water technologies, and adopt or develop appropriate additional technologies, to satisfy water demand at the point of need and limit the use of bottled water except where the situation dictates its use e. Key Finding 3. Emerging technologies such as the improved turbine engine program and high-efficiency drive systems would provide significant reductions in fuel demand for aircraft, the M1 Abrams, and the M2 Bradley and increases in system efficiencies.
Selective use of hybrid and electric vehicles in rear areas would reduce fuel demands. Use of high-efficiency auxiliary power units could not only reduce fuel demands but could also enable use of electric systems in vehicle design.
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Advancements in fuel cell design, micro- and smart-grid employment, and battery efficiency would similarly reduce the demand for fuel. Use of small modular nuclear reactors in rear areas could provide large-scale power sources. Key Recommendation 3. The Army should strongly support continued development and fielding of a portfolio of promising technologies to reduce fuel and energy demand, including acceleration of the improved turbine engine program and more fuel-efficient engines for the M1 Abrams and the M2 Bradley or their replacements, recognizing that it will take success in several areas to reduce the overall demand.
Key Finding 4. Precision munitions potentially offer significant reductions in required munition expenditures and qualitative improvements in effectiveness, thereby reducing ammunition demand and its logistics burden.
The additional costs of precision munitions must be weighed against the total costs of employing nonprecision munitions in the aggregate, from the ammunition plant to the target. Similarly, initial tests of directed energy weapons have indicated both their effectiveness and the reduction in logistics support required for their employment. Key Recommendation 4. The Army should adopt the use of precision munitions as widely as practical within mission requirements, and should use directed-energy weapons systems if ongoing tests are successful.
Key Finding 5. The planning of Army production, transportation, maintenance, storage, and expenditure of ammunition are carried out as relatively independent activities that have successfully supported military operations and has improved the efficiency of several elements of the ammunition supply chain. However, there is no indication that the Army is taking advantage of usage data from the past 25 years, experience from changes in weapons technology over past decades, or future opportunities that may exist to lessen the ammunition burden.
There has been no significant effort to examine ammunition as a system or which ammunition mixes will provide the optimum combination of fires effectiveness and logistics burden minimization. Provided by Chris J. Key Recommendation 5. As one of the largest logistics burdens faced by the Army, it is imperative that the Army maintain cognizance over all aspects of the ammunition supply chain and identify steps that could be taken to ensure the effectiveness of the support provided to combat units and the potential for reductions in the ammunition tonnages that needs to be moved in battle situations.
The Army should conduct a comprehensive analysis of the ammunition system with a view toward linking analysis of battlefield experience with the operations of the system as a whole. Key Finding 6. Over the past decade, the effectiveness of the individual soldier has been increased by on-person combat support systems. However, at the same time, the weight the soldier must carry has increased. Technologies for effectively meeting power demands for individual soldiers are emerging and offer the potential to reduce soldier load and increase soldier trust in the power reliability of carried systems.
Key Recommendation 6. The portfolio of projects under way to reduce the weight of power supplies for an individual soldier should be given emphasis, and the resulting equipment should be fielded as soon as possible. Key Finding 7. The Army will be dependent on its organic watercraft capabilities for much of its intratheater transportation in many areas of the world. The age and capabilities of the watercraft currently in the inventory will limit such support.
They are slow, have insufficient capacity, are too few in number, are highly sensitive to sea state, and could be impediments to efficient and effective logistics in the Asia-Pacific theater. Key Recommendation 7. It should also consider the acquisition of the Ship-to-Shore Connector vessel under the Navy program. Key Finding 8. Autonomous vehicle technologies offer a significant opportunity to automate military operations in an effort to improve logistics operations. Unmanned and remote-controlled helicopters and precision air drop systems can significantly reduce the demand for ground-based resupply of forward areas in high-risk or limited-access situations.
Resupply operations over the last tactical mile could be efficiently performed by autonomous vehicles to reduce the risks to supply vehicle operators and lighten the load that small units currently must carry. Autonomous vehicles are ready to be deployed in constrained settings with limited obstacles and established routes. They are not yet ready to deploy in operational settings with rough terrain or unpredictable routes. Unmanned and remote-controlled helicopters have been effectively employed by the Marine Corps for resupply in Afghanistan on a test basis, and development continues.
Key Recommendation 8. Autonomous vehicle technologies should be implemented in phases, starting with what is possible now using semiautonomous technologies, such as leader-follower, so that incremental improvements to logistics can be realized as the technology matures.
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Research and development should be continued to develop these technologies for use in challenging, unpredictable environments that are currently beyond the capabilities of these technologies. The Army should work. The Army should continue to support rapid development and fielding of precision airdrop for sustainment to forward areas and pursue a helicopter-borne Joint Precision Airdrop System capability to expand its overall sustainment options and capabilities. Key Finding 9. Additive manufacturing provides an emerging capability to produce components in support of Army logistics system needs at the point of need and to improve the responsiveness of the Army maintenance system.
Present additive manufacturing efforts are ongoing across the Army and are close to the state of the art. However, additional development is required to 1 fully realize the benefits of additive manufacturing and 2 make it widely useful forward of fixed facilities, such as depots, given the current heavy power demands and challenges in base material management and standard setting.
Key Recommendation 9. The Army should support standards development that would form the basis for qualifying components produced by additive manufacturing. Key Finding The Army has expended considerable resources on implementing what may be the largest enterprise resource planning system ever. The other Services have a mixed record of success in implementing such systems. Successful implementation of the program will require strong and continuous support and an understanding by Army leadership of the challenges and opportunities that the continuously evolving systems will face.
In addition to the ever-present technical issues that will develop, there will be a need to develop new decision support tools and applications that can utilize GCSS-A and LMP data and to pay attention to cybersecurity issues as the threats evolve. Key Recommendation To ensure that the Army Logistics Enterprise Systems is fully implemented and operated efficiently over its life, the Army should provide constant resource and organizational support for the Army Enterprise Systems Integration Program, the Global Combat Support System-Army, and the Logistics Modernization Program, even after full implementation of the initial systems and related tools and applications.
Without such support, the overall system will rapidly atrophy. Army logistics network has made considerable progress in improving in-transit visibility to the supply support activity and the unit motor pool. Estimated shipping dates and advanced shipping notices are routinely provided, which has improved availability and readiness. The benefit of this would be a reduction in the current practice of placing redundant orders due to a lack of confidence in the supply system.
NRC, When systems are being developed, the results of logistics analyses are not quantified in terms of warfighting effects or the impact they might have on the logistics system as a whole e. As a result, logistics systems and logistics requirements do not fare well when competing with other types of systems or subsystems.
The Army should revitalize its logistics analysis capability by acquiring the necessary tools and qualified military and civilian analysts in quantities commensurate with the number and impact of logistics decisions that need to be made. Modeling, simulation, and analysis tools need to be improved to explicitly include logistics factors. Contractors and the Army Reserve represent important elements of the Army and joint logistics team and, given the reductions in active military force structure, must be considered an essential component in the planning and execution of operations.
They possess unique knowledge of the functions they may be called on to carry out and, in the case of contractors, on-the-ground experience in potential areas of operations. At present, they are excluded from participation in contingency planning until contracted or invited to do so. Both Army and combatant command leaders should integrate contractors and the Army Reserve into their contingency planning process from the beginning and on a continuous basis.
Planners in both the Army and combatant commands should be schooled in the capabilities of contractor organizations and the Army Reserve to assist in contingency planning.
For contractors, this may require establishing ongoing contracts for the support of specific combatant commands or regions so they can engage in planning processes within the combatant commands. Guidelines for support of military operations over time by contractors are frequently formulated on the fly as operations evolve.
This results in inconsistencies in the provision of services, competition among units and services, and a lack of attention to both potential support costs and the logistical burdens that are created. The necessity for these guidelines prior to the start of operations was a lesson learned in Vietnam. Army leadership, in coordination with its sister Services, the Joint Staff, and combatant commanders, should establish guidelines for the support to be provided for contingency operations over time as the mission and needs develop.
The committee recognizes that transformation takes time and that moving to joint logistics represents a significant change in culture. However, it has been over a decade since the military community began serious discussions of joint logistics and nearly 5 years since the Joint Staff articulated a vision for integrated logistics, and signs of progress are limited.
The committee, during its review and its interviews with senior logistics personnel, both retired and active, could not find strong evidence that the Army and the joint community were actively involved in implementing a joint logistics effort. There remains a strong belief among the leadership of the Services that their Title X responsibilities trump the authorities of the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders to require the conduct of joint logistics operations. There was clear articulation that, absent directives from the Secretary of Defense, the services will not move rapidly to embrace joint logistics activities or aspects of joint operational activities.
Wherever possible and appropriate, the Army should strongly support and become a part of joint logistics and related research and development activities. As a starting point, the Army should review the status of implementation of Appendix B of the Joint Concept , Key Indicators of the Military Problem , along with the operational issues described in by the G-4 of the Army. The Army G-4 should initiate discussions with Special Operations Command SOCOM to revisit existing logistics and sustainment support policies, agreements, and capabilities including linked databases with the stated objective of revising them for their mutual benefit.