George's for the past thirty-nine years, claims that he is the last of the change ringers — a true campanologist versed in the art of ringing a complex pattern of changes on a number of bells. She's really a very enthusiastic campanologist. I suppose you wouldn't expect it from the Lady of the Manor, but we can always rely on her to give a good strong pull on Little Jim. I thought you would have come to visit me. I've been getting Harry set up. Skylights in the ceiling, that sort of thing. She's doing another book. Maurice Gee, The centenarian campanologist carried out duties in the bell tower at St Simon and St Jude for more than 80 years.
With best friend Jo Hence campanologist and also campanula. The campanula I am referring to is a species called muralis and is known as the Alpine bellflower. Campanologist Kenneth Cauchi writes on the history and the evolution of the bells of Floriana parish church while Stephen Zammit gives all the I am a campanologist.
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Sisters of the Bruce by J. Harvey Troubador Publishing Ltd. Pub Date 30 Sep Sisters of the Bruce J. Wartenberg ed. He presents the example of the power that a university teacher has over her students in grading their work. This power is of course broadly dependent upon the whole social context of university institutions and systems of grading, and so on.
But it is also more directly dependent upon co-ordination with the actions of a narrow class of social others: for instance, the potential employers who take notice of grades. Or rather, the social alignment is partly constitutive of the power relation. She possesses her power, if you like, in virtue of her place in the broader network of power relations. Now, the mere idea of such practical co-ordination is thoroughly generic, applying to the power required to get anything at all done in the social world—my power to cash a cheque is dependent on practical co-ordination with the cashier at the bank and a range of other social agents.
What, then, is distinctive of social power? Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organisation. However, I believe that there is such a conception available, and that the notion of control, in slightly more generic guise, remains essential. In agential relations of power, one party controls the actions of another party or parties. In such cases there is always a social group that is properly described as being controlled, even while that control has no particular agent behind it, for purely structural operations of power are always such as to create or preserve a given social order.
It is right, then, to allow that an exercise of power need not be bad for anyone. But there is at least one form of social power which requires not only practical social co-ordination but also an imaginative social co-ordination. There can be operations of power which are dependent upon agents having shared conceptions of social identity—conceptions alive in the collective social imagination that govern, for instance, what it is or means to be a woman or a man, or what it is or means to be gay or straight, young or old, and so on.
Gender is one arena of identity power, and, like social power more generally, identity power can be exercised actively or passively. Testimonial Injustice 15 what he does is perhaps well-intentioned and benevolently paternal. But it is no less an exercise of identity power. She might already be silenced by the mere fact that he is a man and she a woman.
Imagine a social context in which it is part of the construction of gender not merely that women are more intuitive than rational, but, further, that they should never pitch their word against that of a man. In that sort of social situation, a Herbert Greenleaf would have exercised the same power over a Marge—his power as a man to silence her as a woman—but passively.
He would have done it, so to speak, just by being a man. Note that the operation of identity power does not require that either party consciously accept the stereotype as truthful.
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If we were to interpret Marge as thoroughly aware of the distorting nature of the stereotype used to silence her, it would still be no surprise that she should be silenced by it. The conceptions of different social identities that are activated in operations of identity power need not be held at the level of belief in either subject or object, for the primary modus operandi of identity power is at the level of the collective social imagination.
Consequently, it can control our actions even despite our beliefs. Identity power typically operates in conjunction with other forms of social power. The identity power itself, however, is something non-material—something wholly discursive or imaginative, for it operates at the level of shared conceptions of what it is to be a gentleman and what it is to be a commoner, the level of imagined social identity. Thus identity power is only one facet of social identity categories pertaining to, say, class or gender, since such categories will have material implications as well as imaginative aspects.
Could there be a purely structural operation of identity power? There could; indeed, identity power often takes purely structural form. To take up our disenfranchisement example again, we can imagine an informally disenfranchised group, whose tendency not to vote arises from the fact that their collectively imagined social identity is such that they are not the sort of people who go in for political thinking and discussion.
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Conversely, we can imagine that among those groups that do vote, identity power plays its part here too. Identity power, like social power in general, may be agential or purely structural; it may work positively to produce action or negatively to constrain it; and it may work in the interests of the agent whose actions are so controlled, or again it may work against them.
The reason for our particular interest in identity power is that we shall be concerned with how it is involved in the sort of discursive exchange in which knowledge can be imparted from speaker to hearer—in the broadest sense, testimonial exchange. This use of stereotypes may be entirely proper, or it may be misleading, depending on the stereotype. I now turn to the exploration of this dual epistemic and ethical dysfunction. No doubt these things are possible, but given that for the most part it is generally in the interests of hearers to believe what is true and not believe what is false, it would be a strong prejudice in an unusual context that would be single-handedly powerful enough to have that sort of effect.
With regard to the former, consider an overburdened GP whose patients ask him medical questions that call for a more specialist training. He is not in a position to answer them fully responsibly; yet he must do his best to answer them, since the patients need an answer, and he is the only source they have access to.
His patients assume that he is in a position to provide the information they need, and thus they attribute to him an excess of credibility on the matters in question. All this is an ethical burden for our GP, because he is aware that his best advice might yet mislead them about an important health issue. For this GP, the credibility excess he receives from his patients brings an unwanted ethical burden, and so we see that credibility excess can be disadvantageous.
I shall discuss these views in Ch. Testimonial Injustice 19 a disadvantage to her.
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In such circumstances as these, then, credibility excess can be disadvantageous, though on the whole it is surely more usually an advantage. Consider the stuttering Claudius, destined one day to be emperor of Rome, but who repeatedly escapes political murder on the way up owing to the fact that he is generally taken to be a fool.
Or alternatively, recall that inimitable character from Seventies TV crime detection, Lieutenant Columbo, whose bumbling and shambolic style lures those he is investigating into a false sense of security and enables him to quiz them off-guard. Unlike those goods that are fruitfully dealt with along distributive lines such as wealth or health care , there is no puzzle about the fair distribution of credibility, for credibility is a concept that wears its proper distribution on its sleeve. On the contrary, our imagined professor and GP are overly esteemed in their capacity as knowers.
Suppose we imagine someone growing up who, because of various social prejudices overwhelmingly in his favour, is constantly epistemically puffed up by the people around him. No doubt the credibility excess he tends to receive from most interlocutors in his class-ridden society will be advantageous: it is very likely to bring him lucrative employment and a certain automatic high status in many of his discursive exchanges, and so on. But what if all this also causes him to develop such an epistemic arrogance that a range of epistemic virtues are put out of his reach, rendering him closed-minded, dogmatic, blithely impervious to criticism, and so on?
Is it not the case that such a person has in some degree quite literally been made a fool of? Selby-Bigge, 3rd edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press, Testimonial Injustice 21 the catalogue of credibility excesses that have malformed his epistemic character amounts to some sort of testimonial injustice?
Is he not, after all, precisely wronged in his capacity as a knower? I think the answer is probably Yes, and we are perhaps confronted with an interesting special case of testimonial injustice. Note, however, that it is cumulative, whereas our focus has been on token cases of the injustice. Consequently, I would suggest that while the example does indicate that some people in a consistently privileged position of social power might be subject to a variant strain of testimonial injustice: namely, testimonial injustice in its strictly cumulative form; none the less it does not show that any token cases of credibility excess constitute a testimonial injustice.
So long as her false belief is itself ethically and epistemically non-culpable it does not, for example, result from an immoral hatefulness or from epistemic carelessness , there will be nothing culpable in her misjudgement of his credibility. It is simply an unlucky epistemic mistake of one or another familiar kind. Yet I would suggest that her misjudgement does him no real testimonial injustice.
It is simply an innocent error. At least, I suggest that we circumscribe the concept in this manner. But this would be a very weak sense of injustice; so much so that it is a mere shadow of our ordinary ethical and political sense of the word and lacks the usual implication of moral badness. This is largely a terminological point, so if others disagree, then they can regard cases of innocent error as producing a weak form of testimonial injustice.
The proposal I am heading for is that the ethical poison in question is that of prejudice. The year is , and the scene a courtroom in Maycomb County, Alabama. The defendant is a young black man named Tom Robinson. It is obvious to the reader, and to any relatively unprejudiced person in the courtroom, that Tom Robinson is entirely innocent. If he pushes her away, then he will be found to have assaulted her; yet if he is passive, he will equally be found to have assaulted her. So he does the most neutral thing he can, which is to run, though knowing all the while that this action too will be taken as a sign of guilt.
Similarly, there are many things he cannot say in court and stand a chance of being heard as truthful. The witness realized his mistake and shifted uncomfortably in the chair. But the damage was done. Mr Gilmer paused a long time to let it sink in. For feeling sorry for someone is a taboo sentiment if you are black and the object of your sympathy is a white person. The fact that Tom Robinson makes the sentiment public raises the stakes in a way that is disastrous for legal justice and for the epistemic justice on which it depends.
As it turns out, the members of the jury stick with their prejudiced perception of the defendant, formed principally by the racial stereotypes of the day. He said it more to himself than to the court. I punched Jem. Finch evidently takes it that what the jury need to be urged to do is to make the right judgement, to do the right epistemic thing. When they do deliver the guilty verdict, this attests to their failure in their duty to make the proper testimonial judgement, in the light of the evidence.
They fail, as Atticus Finch feared, precisely in their duty to believe Tom Robinson. Given the evidence put before them, their immovably prejudiced social perception of Robinson as a speaker leads at once to a gross epistemic failure and an appalling ethical failure of grave practical consequence. As it turns out, Tom Robinson does not survive long enough to go ahead with any appeal, for he is shot in the back as he tries, we hear it said, to escape over the prison fence right in front of the guards.
It is perhaps worth remarking that even the most hateful prejudicial ideologies may be sustained not only by explicitly hateful thought and talk but also by more domestic stereotypical ideas that are almost cosy in comparison. There is a relatively light-hearted theme of epistemic untrustworthiness that runs through the book as a leitmotif, softly echo- ing the deadly serious racist exclusion from epistemic trust of the sort that leads ultimately to the killing of Tom Robinson.
Imagine, for instance I adapt an example proposed to me by a scientist , a panel of referees on a science journal who have a dogmatic prejudice against a certain research method. It might reasonably be complained by a would-be contributor that authors who present hypotheses on the basis of the disfavoured method receive a prejudicially reduced level of credibility from the panel.
Thus the prejudice is such as to generate a genuine testimonial injustice writing being one medium of testimony. Let us say that the testimonial injustice produced here is incidental. By contrast, testimonial injustices that are connected, via a common prejudice, with other types of injustice, might appropriately be termed systematic.
Being subject to a tracker prejudice renders one susceptible not only to testimonial injustice but to a gamut of different injustices, and so when such a prejudice generates a testimonial injustice, that injustice is systematically connected with other kinds of actual or potential injustice. Clearly the testimonial injustice suffered by Tom Robinson is systematic, for racial prejudice renders him susceptible to a panoply of injustices besides the testimonial kind. The main type the only type?
Let us call this sort of prejudice identity prejudice. Gilmer deliberately controls the jurors, and sure enough the jurors go on to control what Tom Robinson does, preventing him from conveying his knowledge to them. Consider the following case an anecdote recounted to me by a philosopher of science.
There is a large international conference dominated by research scientists and some historians of science, with only a smattering of philosophers of science. These testimonial injustices, however, do not instantiate our central case, for they are not systematic. It therefore produces only an incidental testimonial injustice. To categorize a testimonial injustice as incidental is not to belittle it ethically.
Localized prejudices and the injustices they produce may be utterly disastrous for the subject, especially if they are repeated frequently so that the injustice is persistent. The importance of systematicity is simply that if a testimonial injustice is not systematic, then it is not central from the point of view of an interest in the broad pattern of social justice. The most severe forms of testimonial injustice are both persistent and systematic.
Such is the case for Tom Robinson, who lives in a society in which the prejudice that devalues his word also blocks his everyday pursuits repeatedly and in every social direction. By contrast, cases of testimonial injustice that are neither persistent nor systematic are on the whole unlikely to be very disadvantageous. Generally speaking, systematic injustice tends towards persistence, because the imaginative conceptions of social identity that feature in the relevant tracker prejudices are likely to be enduring features of the social imagination.
Prejudice can insinuate itself in a number of ways, but I shall pursue the idea that its main point of entry is via stereotypes that we make use of as heuristics in our credibility judgements. The social psychology literature presents an array of varying conceptions. I shall say a little more about the nature of stereotypes later when I consider them as images, but for now let me state that stereotypes are widely held associations between a given social group and one or more attributes.
This conception is broad in three ways. First, it is neutral with respect to whether the generalization embodied by the stereotype is reliable or not. Yzerbyt, and Russell Spears eds. Prejudice in the Credibility Economy 31 affective aspect such as commitments which derive from the collective imagination and which may permit less transparency than beliefs.
The stereotype of women as intuitive is a case in point. There may also be contexts in which both the positive and the negative valence are somehow in play—the stereotype might work like a barbed compliment, for instance. A generalization can of course be more or less strong. The idea that we use stereotypes in our credibility judgements is in line with currents in social psychology: The past few decades have witnessed a shift away from a view of judgments as the products of rational, logical decision making marred by the occasional presence of irrational needs and motives toward a view of the person as heuristic user.
Such a purely doxastic conception of what it is to hold a stereotype seems too narrow, certainly for present purposes. This certainly picks out the most ethically problematic kind of stereotyping, and therefore sits naturally in an analysis of what is morally wrong with stereotyping people; but it would be too narrow for present purpos- es—what he calls stereotypes I distinguish as negative identity-prejudicial stereotypes.
Jones and Thomas Martin eds. Without such a heuristic aid he will not be able to achieve the normal spontaneity of credibility judge- ment that is characteristic of everyday testimonial exchange. Consider the stereotype of the dependable family doctor. In so far as the associa- tion crystallized in this stereotype means that it embodies an empirically reliable generalization about family doctors, it is epistemically desirable that the stereotype should help shape the credibility judgements we make when such doctors give us general medical advice.
Much of everyday tes- timony requires the hearer to engage in a social categorization of speakers, and that is how stereotypes oil the wheels of testimonial exchange. But what if an identity prejudice is at work in the stereotype? Kahneman, P. Slovic, and A.
Tversky eds. Prejudice in the Credibility Economy 33 pre-judgement, where this is most naturally interpreted in an internalist vein as a judgement made or maintained without proper regard to the evidence, and for this reason we should conceive of prejudice generally as something epistemically culpable. These might be circumstances in which it is simply too much to expect the subject to achieve awareness that a certain prejudice is structuring his social consciousness, let alone to realign his habits of credibility judgement accordingly.
Consider Solomon. Both papers were originally published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. So far, Arpaly suggests, Solomon could not be accused of any marked irrationality. But now she asks us to imagine that he goes to university, where he studies alongside able women students.
If this counter-evidence to his view shifts the belief, then the belief is revealed as an honest mistake. I am unsure whether she intends to commit herself on this score, but the point is worth raising in its own right. There are different sorts of prejudice. But prejudice taken generally is a broader notion.
It is broader in two respects. We do not have to stipulate that the referees are host to an ethically bad motivation in order to represent them as prejudiced. These are not admirable motivations, but nor are they in themselves ethically bad. Second, prejudice is not always against someone or something, for there can be prejudice in favour. Prejudice can have a positive valence. We can summarize the general conception of prejudice that has now emerged as follows: Prejudices are judgements, which may have a positive or a negative valence, and which display some typically, epistemically culpable resistance to counter-evidence owing to some affective investment on the part of the subject.
This affective investment may or may not be ethically bad, but given our central concern with systematic testimonial injustice, we have a special interest in negative identity prejudices, and these are, I take it, always generated by some ethically bad affective investment. Negative identity prejudices are prejudices with a negative valence held against people qua social type.
Now if we put our conception of negative identity prejudice together with our conception of a stereotype, we can say what a negative identity-prejudicial stereotype is: A widely held disparaging association between a social group and one or more attributes, where this association embodies a generalization that displays some typically, epistemically culpable resistance to counter-evidence owing to an ethically bad affective investment.
This is the sort of prejudice that is at work in systematic testimonial injustice. Hearer and speaker are engaged in a form of social interaction, and they inevitably trade in social perceptions of each other. Anticipating the argument for a perceptual model of credibility judgement that I shall give in the next chapter, let us provisionally countenance the idea that in those everyday testimonial exchanges in which the hearer does not deliberate about how far to trust the speaker, the hearer perceives the speaker as trustworthy to this or that degree in what he is telling her.
She perceives him in the light of a set of background assumptions about how far people like him are trustworthy about things like this in relation to people like her, and I have suggested that reliable stereotypes have an essential role to play here. Applying the perceptual idiom to our chief example, we can say that the judgement of the jurors of Maycomb County is so distorted by prejudicial racial stereotype that they cannot, in that courtroom context, perceive Tom Robinson as anything but a lying Negro.
Certainly we may sometimes perpetrate testimonial injustice because of our beliefs; but the more philosophically intriguing prospect is that we may very frequently do it in spite of them. This seems as good an off-the-cuff description as any. If we think of a social stereotype as an image which expresses an association between a social group and one or more attributes, and which thereby embodies one or more generalizations about that social group, then it becomes clearer how its impact on judgement can be harder to detect than that of a belief with the same content.
Images are capable of a visceral impact on judgement, which allows them to condition our judgements without our awareness, whereas it would take an unconscious belief to do so with comparable stealth. But other times it can be that cognitive commitments held in our imaginations retain their impact on how we perceive the social world even after any correlative beliefs have faded away. Given her newly wrought and strongly held feminist beliefs, why should she suspect that her social perceptions might remain shaped by sexist stereotypes?
Perhaps, however, she comes to notice a certain dissonance between her beliefs and her perceptual judgements, and asks herself why it is that she tends not to per- ceive women political candidates as possessing the requisite gravitas. But many prejudices will not be so short- lived.
There is interesting work in such re-creation, but for present purposes the less heavily theoretical notion of the social imagination is a more straightforward option. The idea of the social imaginary originated in the work of Cornelius Castoriadis. See, e. David Ames Curtis Stanford, Calif. Prejudice in the Credibility Economy 39 imagination can impinge on our credibility judgements without our say-so.
We can capture them respectively under a diachronic and a synchronic aspect. Her beliefs have moved on, but contents carried in her social imagination have not, so they constitute a residual prejudicial force that continues to shape her judgements and motivations—not unconsciously in any strict, psycho- analytical sense, but without any focused awareness and without her permission, as we might put it. And an example of the synchronic case might be a lifelong committed anti-racist whose patterns of social judgement none the less betray a residue from racist elements that are contained in the collective social imagination.
Residual prejudice, whether diachronic or synchronic in form, is the sort of prejudice that will bring about the most surreptitious and psychologically subtle forms of testimonial injustice. I take it that an awareness of how such prejudice can, despite ourselves, shape our credibility judgements by stealth lends support to the idea that various degrees of testimonial injustice happen all the time.
This normal model of justice does not ignore injustice but it does tend to reduce it to a prelude to or a rejection and breakdown of justice, as if injustice were a surprising abnormality. I think that testimonial injustice is a normal part of discursive life, even though cries of resentment are relatively few and far between. But I believe that another reason is that our everyday moral discourse lacks a well-established understanding of the wrong that is done to someone when they are treated in this way.
The idea that what I am calling testimonial injustice constitutes an ethical wrong that can be non-trivial, indeed profoundly damaging, and even systematically connected with other forms of injustice in society, is not much appreciated. In this section I have been arguing that prejudice will tend to go most unchecked when it operates by way of stereotypical images held in the collective social imagination, since images can operate beneath the radar of our ordinary doxastic self-scrutiny, sometimes even despite beliefs to the contrary.
I should point out, however, that the converse possibility—of prejudiced beliefs being corrected by unprejudiced social perceptions—is another source of hope, and indeed the general idea that the social imagination can be a powerful positive force for social change depends on it. An example discussed by Arpaly illuminates this possibility.
Arpaly characterizes Huckleberry as having an unprejudiced moral perception of Jim as a full human being in spite of his conventional but highly racially prejudiced beliefs, and she convincingly argues that he is morally praiseworthy for it. Whether, in any given case, hopes for effective self-criticism in a hearer reside in the possibility of her beliefs reforming her perceptions, or her perceptions reforming her beliefs, the more general point is that the possibility of dissonance between the two forms of cognitive commitment is a crucial epistemic and ethical resource for those who aim to reduce prejudice in their judgements of credibility.
But it might be objected that under certain circumstances of epistemic bad luck, a hearer could seemingly perpetrate a testimonial injustice without harbouring any prejudice at all. The sort of epistemic bad luck in play in the following example stems from the fact that even the most reliable, non-prejudicial stereotypes will permit of exceptions.
Imagine that a hearer responsibly judges a speaker to be untrustworthy because insincere owing to the fact that the speaker avoids looking her in the eye, frequently looks askance, and pauses self-consciously in mid-sentence as if to work out his story. In fact, however, this individual is speaking entirely ingenuously, and his shifty manner is simply due to the rather idiosyncratic manifestations of his extraordinary personal shyness. This speaker, let us agree, constitutes an exception to an empirically reliable rule, and thus the testimonial injustice he suffers is caused not by prejudice but simply by bad luck.
What should be said about such an example? But I am inclined, ultimately, to say that we should not consider this case to be an instance of testimonial injustice. If we think of our shy person as wronged, then what about an honest second-hand car salesman? Is she wronged too, however non-culpably? Our shy person has even worse luck than the honest second-hand car salesman, given that we generally have little control over how shy we are or the forms that it takes in our behaviour.
Still, the continuity with the other two examples should lead us to conclude that in the case of our shy person too there is no testimonial injustice, for what is common to all three cases is that the hearer has not put a foot wrong—she has made a credibility judgement that is in line with the evidence, yet, as bad luck would have it, the case proves an exception to the rule. Sometimes it may do very little harm—indeed its impact may be trivial—but other times it may be seriously harmful, most of all when it is persistent and systematic.
Can we say more about the nature of the harm in question? There is of course a purely epistemic harm done when prejudicial stereotypes distort credibility judgements: knowledge that would be passed on to a hearer is not received. This is an epistemic disadvantage to the individual hearer, and a moment of dysfunction in the overall epistemic practice or system. Further, the fact that prejudice can prevent speakers from successfully putting knowledge into the public domain reveals testimonial injustice as a serious form of unfreedom in our collective speech situation—and on a Kantian conception, the freedom of our speech situation is fundamental to the authority of the polity, even to the authority of reason itself.
The harm that concerns us here is not the epistemic harm incurred by the hearer or the epistemic system, nor any implied damage done to the foundations of the polity and its institutions, but rather the immediate wrong that the hearer does to the speaker who is on the receiving end of a testimonial injustice. We should distinguish a primary from a secondary aspect of the harm. In all such injustices the subject is wronged in her capacity as a knower. When one is undermined or otherwise wronged in a capacity essential to human value, one suffers an intrinsic injustice.
We are long familiar with the idea, played out by the history of philosophy in many variations, that our rationality is what lends humanity its distinctive value. No wonder too that in contexts of oppression the powerful will be sure to undermine the powerless in just that capacity, for it provides a direct route to undermining them in their very humanity. The fact that the primary injustice involves insult to someone in respect of a capacity essential to human value lends even its least harmful instances a symbolic power that adds a layer of harm of its own: the epistemic wrong bears a social meaning to the effect that the subject is less than fully human.
When someone suffers a testimonial injustice, they are degraded qua knower, and they are symbolically degraded qua human. In all cases of testimonial injustice, what the person suffers from is not simply the epistemic wrong in itself, but also the meaning of being treated like that. Such a dehumanizing meaning, especially if it is expressed before others, may make for a profound humiliation, even in circumstances where the injustice is in other respects fairly minor. Epistemic trustworthiness has two distinct components: competence and sincerity. Now in a case of testimonial injustice it may often be that both components are impugned by the prejudice in the hearer, in which case the experience of the injustice will have a certain composite character.
Elisabeth Young-Bruehl characterizes three styles of prejudice, two of which are relevant here: the obsessional and the hysterical. They are artless and unintelligent, without spiritual accomplishments, or with gifts for only nonliterate arts like music. Compare the idea that human rights violations fall under a single ethical category even though they can involve attacks on quite different aspects of human personhood.
He writes about the honour we accord an interlocutor when we believe them: When wee believe any saying whatsoever it be, to be true, from arguments taken, not from the thing itselfe, or from the principles of naturall Reason, but from the Authority, and good opinion wee have, of him that hath sayd it; then is the speaker, or person we believe in, or trust in, and whose word we take, the object of our Faith; and the Honour done in Believing, is done to him onely.
Turning now to the secondary aspect of the harm, we see that it is composed of a range of possible follow-on disadvantages, extrinsic to the primary injustice in that they are caused by it rather than being a proper part of it. They seem to fall into two broad categories distinguishing a practical and an epistemic dimension of harm. Prejudice in the Credibility Economy 47 testimonial injustices they put up with in the workplace.
She adopted this policy after mounting frustration at the incredulous reception that her ideas typically got from her male colleagues when she presented them as her own. I think I am right in saying that her attitude was feisty resignation that this was how she got things done, and also perhaps that somewhere in the process she probably got more credit than was allowed to show on the surface.
She was clear none the less that she was considerably disadvantaged by the prejudicial attitudes towards her word as a woman. Another woman, this time working for the company in the USA, told me that she tended not to worry too much about who got the credit for ideas she put forward, so long as the ideas got implemented.
If she made a suggestion and it was not taken up until a male team member had verbalized it, never mind. Getting things done is what mattered to her and what gave her job satisfaction.